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Introduction	  
The practices of meditation and ‘mindfulness training’ recently became subjects 
of great interest in various professional and scientific fields, from psychology to 
neuroscience, from philosophy to medicine. This broad scientific interest in the 
meditative practice follows closely to the gradual spread of popular interest in it, which 
began in the '60s of the last Century in the United States – especially New York, Los 
Angeles and San Francisco – and which has then been disseminated throughout the 
Western world. This phenomenon in both scientific and popular aspects, is part of a 
general influence that the eastern culture has had on the Western society in the second 
part of the XXth Century, an influence that seems to be of a certain interest from a 
sociological point of view. Various are the forms and the reasons of this ‘soft 
colonization’ and one of them certainly is the fascination that some practices have, such 
as zen, yoga, thai chi, and meditation itself.  
However, the focus of my thesis is not on analyzing this general cultural topic 
but, more precisely, i) theoretically investigating how meditation and education can 
work together, and ii) empirically studying the educational and cognitive effects of 
meditation on adult subject, with special regard to the subjective experience description. 
In concrete, it is my intention here to assess the value of mindfulness meditation in 
terms of changes in the so-called ‘first-person perspective’ (FPP), that is how 
meditation affects self-perception and self-description in expert and beginner 
meditators. As we will see, through a qualitative study I will assess the educational 
outcomes of a two month long period of meditation in terms of self-perception and 
experience description skills on healthy adults, both beginners and experts. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter I will consider the 
theoretical framework on which my thesis is based on. In particular I will present a 
short overview of the encounter of phenomenological tradition and cognitive sciences 
during the last decade of the XXth Century, an encounter that has produced the so-
called ‘Embodied Theory’, a school of thought still strongly emerging today. I will 
especially discuss the themes of consciousness and body consciousness that are 
fundamental for my thesis. Another short overview is presented on meditation tradition 
and, especially, on what mindfulness meditation is and where it comes from. 
The second chapter is dedicated on presenting how mindfulness meditation 
practice affects the person. Considering the utility for a pedagogical discourse to 
evaluate the neuroscientific and cognitive aspects of meditation, we will discuss the 
main effects meditation has on the brain and the mind; then, I will discuss how 
meditation fits in well with phenomenological pedagogical theory and practice, how can 
it be considered as a form of experiential education, with special regard to adult 
education. 
In the third chapter, the results of a qualitative study on self-perception and body 
perception will be presented and discussed. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, some general conclusions will be outlined about 
the educational value of meditation, and some suggestions and criticisms will be 
outlined with regard to the didactic and teaching programs of meditation courses.
  10 
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1	  The	  theoretical	   framework:	  phenomenology,	  embodied	  
theory,	  and	  meditation	  
1.1	  A	  short	  overview	  of	  an	  encounter	  
The beginning was an encounter. Between two different disciplines and school 
of thought, as different as chalk and cheese. The difference is probably the reason of 
this definite successful encounter which happened twenty years ago and is still 
increasing. 
Along the last three years I have had the opportunity to investigate a theoretical 
area which has always fascinated me, which also recently emerged and which has been 
quickly growing/increasing in the past few years. This area is at the intersection of 
different fields and different schools of thought, namely phenomenology, cognitive 
sciences and the dynamical systems theory. Interestingly, meditation has been the 
initiator and mediator of this encounter (Varela, Depraz, & Thompson, 1991). In this 
area many different disciplines had and have a role and a function – to name a few, 
psychology, philosophy, informatics, neuroscience – but educational sciences have been 
out of the game, voluntarily and not, since the very start. Except for a few authors and 
scholars, the role of education within cognitive sciences has been voted more to the 
learning theories or instruction theories than a global, structured and stable pedagogical 
theory. We are going to see how this area came about and later in the text we will see if 
and how education can join the embodied movement. 
So, where does this connection come from? And what is based on? Let us start 
from a short historical overview about the main point of intersection between 
phenomenology and cognitive sciences. As Gallagher says in his recent book 
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“Brainstorming” (2008), phenomenology and cognitive sciences were and are closer 
then it was thought; the best case is the ‘case’ of Merleau-Ponty. It could seem a 
paradox but nowadays Merleau-Ponty – one of the most important phenomenologists – 
is often considered one of the co-founder of the cognitive sciences (Gallese, 2006; 
Gallagher, 2008; 2009; Petit, 2006; Sinigaglia 2009) thanks to his outstanding work on 
perception, self and body, although he and phenomenologists in general are never been 
considered useful to cognitive sciences till twenty years ago. Merleau-Ponty was not 
only one of the leaders of the phenomenological movement of that time – straddling the 
middle of the ‘900 – but he was also extremely interested and qualified for psychology 
and phrenology, a sort of initial version of neuroscience. Starting from this interest, he 
fully addressed the topic of the body within the pedagogy and psychology. Reading, for 
example, “Phenomenology of Perception” (2002), you immediately notice how his 
attitude always oscillates between philosophical discussion and scientific and 
experimental data on the knowledge available at that time, as it is commonly done today 
in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. Among others, he deeply investigated the 
issue of phantom limb, one of the most debated and important topic in the modern 
cognitive neuroscience as well. The contemporary debate on the issues of the body, the 
lived experience and perception is much heated debate in current cognitive science, but 
during the XXth Century Merleau-Ponty has been one of the few to develop a deep and 
structured analysis of these topics, and he probably did more and better than any other 
scholar of the time. This explains why when some researchers today want to study and 
find the philosophical basis of their scientific work, they can not avoid to study the 
French philosopher or, even, to refer to him as a fundamental reference about this topic.  
At the end of the last Century, the work of Merleau-Ponty and 
phenomenologists was surprisingly and effectively brought into the cognitive sciences 
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field mainly by a book; that book was ‘The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience’, and the authors were Francisco Varela, Natalie Depraz and Evan 
Thompson. That book marked a boundary between the old and new paradigm for the 
cognitive sciences, a boundary that nowadays is clearly visible. Today, twenty years 
after the book release, the forerunner work of the early phenomenologists is often 
considered of a critical importance with regard to the following themes (Thompson, 
2007, p. 20): consciousness and subjectivity, intersubjectivity, sociality and social 
cognition, intentionality, subjective experience, perception, body/embodiment, time, 
and research methodologies with special regard to qualitative methods. Among them, 
the ones that are taken in consideration by me for my work are consciousness, 
body/embodiment and qualitative research methodologies. 
The embodied approach, unlike the classic cognitivist one that initially came 
from cybernetics and, later, from informatics and computational approach, deeply re-
evaluates the role that subjective experience plays in the construction and expression of 
cognition and knowledge; following that it recalibrates the research interests and 
methodologies useful to investigate the so-called embodied mind, the mind that is 
ontologically expressed by the connection with the body and the environment, the mind 
that has an ontological first-person dimension. This approach – which has few ancestors 
in some works appeared in the late '70s by scholars as Maturana, together with Varela 
(1980), and Herbert Dreyfus (1972) – in recent years has considerably grown within the 
scientific literature, and has produced several currents of thought: embodied cognition 
or embodiment, grounded cognition, radical embodiment, enactivism, situated cognition 
and embedded cognition, extended mind, naturalized phenomenology, 
neurophenomenology. 
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We can say that everything began with the so-called ‘hard problem’, that is the 
problem of the phenomenological mind (Jackendoff, 1990). At a certain point cognitive 
sciences decided to face it, after year of avoiding it. Varela and collegues pointed out 
clearly that a switch in the paradigm used till that moment was necessary, from a 
behavioral and computational one toward a ‘ecological’, a paradigm able to consider the 
central question for the science of the mind: the problem of ‘Who’, the problem of the 
subject and of the subjective perception of the world. The question was condensed in 
the term ‘experience’, which takes together the subject/object relationship in an 
ongoing, real, live modality and which offers a completely different perspective on the 
mind and the way to study it.  
We will now take a more in depth look at the question of the embodied 
cognition, consciousness and subjective mind. 
 
 
1.2	  The	  phenomenological	  and	  embodied	  mind	  
From the embodied perspective, as well as in Merleau-Ponty, the cognition is 
not considered only as the results of a series of cerebral functions that somehow and 
somewhere interface with the body of the thinking subject. Instead, it has to better seen 
as the result of the constant and structural interface activity with the body and the 
environment, the result of the sensori-motor information that create the background 
from which the mind can emerge and the horizon to which the mind can watch 
(Merleau-ponty, 2002). The body constitutes the cognition itself, it generates it, and it is 
its phylogenetic and ontological matrix. The somatosensory and motor apparatus can no 
longer be considered as mere servants of the noblest prefrontal cortex, performers more 
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or less diligent and skillful command coming from the queen of higher cognitive 
functions; they rather seem to fulfill the dual role of executive and representative system 
(Gallese, 2006, p. 299) and they share the basic function of knowledge construction of 
reality that we constantly put in place (enact) (Gallese, 2006, p. 302). Here there is the 
sense, not only ironic, therefore, of saying that the human being is "out of the head" 
(Noe, 2010): cognition – as well as meta-cognition, consciousness, self, mind or any 
other name we want to give to the self-presence – emerges both evolutionarily and 
biographically from the relationship of the mental and bodily aspects of the human 
nature, and with the environment, creating the lived experience (Gallagher, 2005): 
therefore, embodied cognition indicates that it does not exist – or we have not found it 
yet – something like a view from no-where (Nagel, 1989), because the thought is always 
related and dependent by the whole subject and his all biography. The space-time 
dimensions literally shape the mind (Gallagher, & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 69-85): the thought 
does not merely relate to the body as an object of the outside world but is made from it 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002), it does not stem solely from the interactions in the brain, which 
is a specific organ, but in person, that is the organism.  
So, the problem of the mind recalls the question of the consciousness, which is a 
topic at the core of phenomenology; indeed it is possible to refer to phenomenology as 
the science of consciousness. Consciousness is the origin of the so-called ‘hard 
problem’; Chalmers (1995; 1997) defined “easy problems” the neuroscientific analysis 
of the cognitive functions (low or high level) such as language, memory, learning, 
motor control, sight etc., because they clearly are physiological events not simple but 
reducible to a range of few variable bound to each other by a causal-effect logic and, 
thus, sooner or later explicable. In this case, the researchers create and face questions 
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such as: which and where are the cerebral circuits depute to a specific cognitive 
function? Which specific cerebral areas get active by a specific stimulus? And so on. 
The ‘hard problem, instead, emerges when we switch our interest from the 
analysis of the operational functions – of a physiological nature – to the analysis of the 
phenomenological experience of these functions, which are of a subjective nature, that 
is the way in which a subject perceives himself in the Lebenswelt (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002), in the real world, through his consciousness. Obviously also consciousness can 
be treated as an easy problem, within the causal-effect paradigm, because, for sure, also 
consciousness derives from a biological substrate (which is not the brain but the brain-
body-environment dynamic unit). In this case we speak of NCC (Neuronal Correlates of 
Consciousness, Thompson, & Varela, 2001). But at the same time consciousness has a 
subjective, qualitative and more complex nature that lies on the fact that only the subject 
can experience it. In this case we speak of phenomenological mind or consciousness. I 
can communicate and share the interior states but the others do not have the direct, 
immediate and natural access to it. The ‘first-person’ dimension of the reality challenges 
the researcher to investigate the subject while perceiving and describing himself and his 
own cognitive activity (Shear, & Varela, 1999). In this case the research questions are: 
which are the subjective dimensions of speaking, hearing, remembering, moving, 
seeing? How subjects perceive that? How they describe that? And so on. To these 
questions we can add some others, more pedagogical. Can we educate consciousness? 
Can we improve people’s ability of being aware? Can we speak of the consciousness as 
something that can learn to read the reality? Which representation the subject has of 
himself doing an action? That is to say, when can we speak about someone implicated 
in the perception of something?  
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The etymology of the word ‘consciousness’ indicates self-awareness, or interior 
knowledge of what is going on inside me and to me at a specific moment in a specific 
place. In 1874, Thomas Huxley argued about what William James called “the 
automaton theory”, a theory which compared mental states to a steam whistle that 
contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive (Huxley cited in Pockett, Banks, & 
Gallagher 2006). At that time, in Europe, it was quite normal to consider humans as 
nothing more than “conscious automata.” Sigmund Freud pointed out the remarkable 
influence of unconscious mental processes in ordinary human behaviors (Pockett et al., 
2006). We are often unaware of our actions. Even when an action is consciously 
executed, its memory trace is of such short duration that it is rapidly forgotten. We ask 
ourselves if we have locked the door or turned off the gas seconds after doing it. 
Driving home from work, we think about our day: the meetings we had, who is 
expecting us and, suddenly, we are pulling into the garage. What happened? Which 
route did we actually take? How did we arrive safely while seeming to pay little or no 
attention our journey? 
This is a shorter version of the ‘long-distance truck driver’ problem described by 
Armstrong (Gallagher, & Zahavi 2008, p. 45). The questions that arise from these 
situations are the following: Can I have unconscious perceptions and perform right 
unconscious actions? Can I do something without knowing that I am doing it? 
The answer is yes, we are able to perceive and act in the world without being 
strictly conscious about what we are perceiving and doing. In a famous experiment, 
Libet recorded the EEG event-related potential that was already known to precede a 
voluntary finger movement and compared the onset time of this potential with the time 
at which his subjects reported becoming conscious that they were about to make each 
movement. Libet argued that the conscious awareness came before the actual 
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movement, but after the start of the brain activity leading up to it (Pockett et al., 2006). 
Actually, he did not claim that his subjects' consciousness was entirely epiphenomenal 
or acausal, instead he proposed that since it arose slightly in advance of the movement 
itself, they might still be capable of exerting a veto in the fraction of a second before 
acting but this claim is debatable. 
The intention of some theories is to consider the consciousness completely 
useless and not credible (Metzinger, 1995; 2004), something that even prevents action 
planning, control and execution. From the phenomenological point of view, instead, the 
consciousness is the core of the mind and life, because it gives the sense of what is 
going on even without having a role in the decision making process. Any experience 
depends on at least minimal form of self-consciousness which allow to consider the 
experience as my experience, within the time-space flow of experience:  
“Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an 
immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as 
my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-
personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in 
terms of a ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousess.  By calling the type of self-
consciousness in question ‘pre-reflective’, we wish to emphasize that it 
does not involve an additional second-order mental state that in some 
way is directed in an explicit manner towards the experience in question. 
Rather, the self-consciousness must be understood as an intrinsic feature 
of the primary experience. (…) I can, of course, reflect on and attend to 
my experience, I can make it the theme or object of my attention, but 
prior to reflecting on it, I wasn’t ‘mind- or self-bling’. The experience 
was already present to me, it was already something for me, and in that 
sense it counts as being pre-reflectively conscious.”  (Gallagher, & 
Zahavi, 2008, p. 46) 
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Gallagher and Zahavi (2005; 2008) introduce the difference between the pre-
reflective self-consciousness and the reflective self-consciousness. The latter lies on the 
first as a bird, flying, lies on the air; you do not see the air but it is right there and it 
constitutes the background on which every movement can be done. Then the reflective 
self-consciousness is the background on which every consciousness of something can 
appear to the subject; even without any reflection on my own mental activity, being 
conscious of something is always being conscious of someone (Gallagher, & Zahavi 
2005; 2008, p. 50). The idea that we already are into the experience prior our own 
conscious awareness is well explained by this phenomenological concept of ‘pre-
reflective self-consciousness’. “The notion of pre-relfective self-consciousness is relate 
to the idea that experiences have a subjective ‘feel’ to them, a certain (phenomenal) 
quality of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have them”, without the need to 
reflect on it (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p. 49). We are always already there, before we 
are able to conceptualize our conscious presence. Experience has always a certain way 
to manifest itself, and this certain way is certain for someone. In phenomenology, an 
experience requires a subject; there is a sort of self-referentiality of for-me-ness 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, p. 50). So, every kind of experience is characterized by a form of 
mineness (Meinheit) that makes the experience meaning something for somebody. The 
ability of the subject to create meaning about his experience is something that has to be 
investigated further more by educational sciences because can be improved.   
This is the first-personal givenness of the phenomenal experience and it can be 
split in two different modalities: the weak and the strong first-person perspective. The 
first is related to having or embodying the perspective, the subjective manifestation of 
one’s own experiential life; the second has to do with the linguistic ability to refer and 
articulate the experience (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p. 47). In my studies I tried to 
  20 
investigate both of them, surely throughout the second one, believing that the two 
modalities of the firs-person perspective are strictly related especially from an 
educational point of view. Pre-reflective self-consciousness doesn’t amount to first-
person knowledge; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What I investigated 
with my study that is presented in this thesis is nothing more than the mineness, the 
subjective dimension of the meditative experience. 
 
 
1.3	  The	  body	  consciousness	  
The embodied approach makes clear that in the mind-body relationship the body 
not only precedes the mind for stimuli reaction but also it is active for the interpretation 
and comprehension of reality (Gallese, 2006). In fact we must speak of discovery of the 
sensorimotor and somatosensitive systems given that, twenty years ago, the sensitive 
system and the motor system were considered as separate; but now we know better that 
perception and action are so strictly coupled that we have to speak of the birth of the 
sensorimotor paradigm (Gallese, 2006, pp. 307-308). The ability to understand reality, 
including the social world, seems to have a pragmatic and prelinguistic nature more 
than a semantic and representational one (Gallese, 2006, pp. 313-314). So, if 
consciousness is the awareness of what is happing in a given place in a given moment, 
what are we precisely aware of? The first object of our perception is our body; the body 
is the fundamental account of the consciousness (Petit, 2006). Even when we don’t 
intentionally pay attention to the kinetic sensations – and that happens most of the time 
– the sensorimotor system creates what Damasio call the proto self (Damasio, 2000, p. 
285), which is comparable with what I said before about pre-reflective self-
  21 
consciousness. The body gives us the awareness of being the person we are, the same 
person of the day before, in a certain environment in a certain moment. Paraphrasing 
Heidegger, who was used to say that the language is the house of the being, from an 
embodied perspective we should now say that the body is the house of the being. 
Looking deeper at the phenomenological analysis of the bodily consciousness 
we find important theoretical and philosophical references to Husserl’s work and, 
especially, to the work of Merleau-Ponty, whose distinction between Körper (the body 
as object) and Leib (the lived body) is a sort of cornerstone (Gallagher 2006, p.12). This 
general distinction leads to a theoretical distinction with interesting repercussions in 
educational practice, between the body as an instrument that can be used in functional 
and instrumental ways in sports, performance and communication and the body as the 
expression of the individual identity. There is, in the educational practice, a difference 
between motor skills education and physical education on the one hand and body 
education on the other (Calidoni et al., 2004; Farnè, 2008) where the first are more 
attentive to the development of motor skills and applicative goals (Körper) while the 
second point directly to the development of body identity (Leib). The lived body is 
strictly connected to the way in which the subject can operate in to the world through 
practical knowledge and habits, which are flexible and situationally attuned tendencies 
towards actions that are performed without explicit thoughts and deliberate reflection 
prior to action. It is through our habits that we usually interact with the world, and 
habits are what our body learnt from the interacting experience with the world 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 151). 
As Standal points out (2009): “Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2002) prefers the 
notions ‘skill’ and ‘skillful coping’ over ‘habit’ due to the reasons that the concept of 
habit derives from the behaviorism; “rigid behavior”, which is the connotation of habit, 
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says Dreyfus, “is exactly what Merleau-Ponty is trying to distinguish from the flexible 
and situation-sensitive skills that make up l’habitude” (p. 145). L’habitude is the word 
used in the French text of Phenomenology of perception, and which is translated as 
‘habit’ in the English edition. But, the notion habit, to Dreyfus, is so infused with 
unwanted connotations that the use of the word ‘habit’ destroys the intended meaning of 
l’habitude. However, Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus use habits and skills to denote a 
flexible, situational, and adjustable ability to act, in the Lebenswelt through the lived 
body or Leib”.  
I am so deeply interested in this notion because I think that meditative practice 
does not change and affect only the body as object (Körper) but also the way to live the 
body and to be a body (Leib). Merleau-Ponty was interested in the notion of habit for 
the same reasons that he was interested in behavior and movement: they are phenomena 
that can be properly understood neither by intellectualism nor empiricism. Again from 
Standal (2009, p. 59) “Empiricism would equate habit with the conditioned reflexes, i.e. 
the behaviourist program of establishing causal links between stimuli and responses. 
The intellectualist account of habit would be the automatism of mental representations, 
where proper mental representation is called up and movement executed without 
conscious monitoring of the acting subject. Merleau-Ponty rejects both these 
explanations: “Habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body, but in 
the body as mediator of the world” (2002, p. 167). It is not in thought (intellectualism) 
or in the objective body (empiricism) that we find the home of habits. It is to be found 
in the body itself. Merleau- Ponty gives us an example to explain this idea, the example 
of people who are skillful at typewriting. He states that these people are not in 
possession of knowledge of the place of each letter among all the others on the 
keyboard; neither have they acquired a conditioned reflex for each one. What, then, is 
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the epistemic status of habits? “[Habit] is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming 
only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that 
effort. The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where one 
of our limbs is, through a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a 
position in objective space” (2002, p. 166)”. 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty habit is a form of ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing 
that’. It is embodied knowledge; hence it is referred to as knowledge in the hands. The 
body involved in these habits is to Merleau-Ponty, “the third term”, the alternative to 
the intellectualists’ and empiricists’ account of the body. It is a body that does not find 
its place in objective space. The spatiality of the body-in-action is the spatiality of a 
situation rather than a spatiality of a position (2002, p. 115). Here is an “experiment” 
you can do for yourself in order to see how this is so: Can you tell which finger you use 
to press letter ‘S’ on the key board of your computer? Most people, who are somewhat 
proficient at typing, wouldn’t. But if they have to write a letter and they sit down by 
their keyboard, the finger will find the letter immediately without the intervention of 
thought. 
How should we talk about the body-in-action? Or, more specifically, how 
should we denote this “third term”, which is so important in Merleau-Ponty? It is 
necessary now go on now by drawing upon another distinction found in Merleau-Ponty, 
and later developed and clarified by Gallagher (cf. 2005); namely that between body 
schema and body image. Merleau-Ponty takes up the body schema in his investigation 
of the spatiality of the body (2002, pp. 112-170). He describes it initially as a 
“compendium of our bodily experience... supposed to register for me the positional 
changes of parts of my body for each movement of them [...] a total awareness of my 
posture in the intersensory world, a ‘form’ in the sense used by Gestalt psychology” 
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(2002, pp. 113-114). The body schema is thus not an entity lying within the body, but 
extends into to the world and incorporates the projects that the subject is involved in. In 
grammatical terms, the body schema should not be thought of as a noun, but rather as an 
adverb, as a manner or style of being in the world. 
According to Gallagher (2005) the body image “consists of a complex set of 
intentional states and dispositions – perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes – in which the 
intentional object is one’s own body” (p. 25). That is, the body or parts of the body, is 
consciously attended to as an object for perception. So, the difference between body 
schema and image is that with the body image “one is consciously attending to body”, 
whereas with the body schema one is “marginally aware of the body” (Gallagher, 2005, 
p. 27). The body is more of a fully-fledged object in the body image than is the case 
with the body schema. The body schema, according to Gallagher, does its work “before 
we know it” (2005, p. 5), and is thus a structure that structures our experiences of the 
body-in-action. It takes account of the environment in a pragmatic fashion, and can 
incorporate into its structure objects in the environment, so that the limits between the 
body and environment become blurred. 
The term ‘lived body’ clearly points to the phenomenological ambition of giving 
an account of the body as we live it. In Gallagher’s interpretation, the body schema is a 
prenoetic structure of embodiment, which to some extent is phenomenologically hidden. 
The crucial point here is that the body-subject contains the prenoetic operations of the 
body schema and the pre-reflective awareness of the body as it is lived. The term 
prenoetic refers to the hidden aspects of our embodiment, or as Gallagher (2005) puts it: 
“To ask about the prenoetic effects of embodiment is to ask about what happens behind 
the scenes of awareness, and about how the body anticipates and sets the stage for 
consciousness” (p. 2). 
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Thus, following the suggestions that come from embodied theory, the object of 
my investigation has to be an experience, a lived experience, and the body, a lived body. 
The influence of these theories on me has been huge and the research question of my 
thesis concern with the practical, experiential, lived experience of meditation; indeed 
meditation has an important philosophical tradition and it is a practice that seem to fit 
perfectly within the phenomenological frame and within the embodied theory.
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1.4	  Meditation	  and	  Mindfulness	  Meditation:	  a	  definition	  
Nowadays the term ‘meditation’ is broadly used, but not always his right 
meaning is well understood (Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007; Tarozzi, 2002). We first 
need to specify what meditation is also from the etymological perspective, making then 
as clear as possible what mindfulness meditation is, without forgetting at the same time 
that some structured forms of meditative practices were already present at the era of the 
Ancient Greek (Mortari, 2002). 
The word ‘meditation’ comes from meditare (medo-mai), that means at the same 
time ‘to measure’ and ‘to think’, a sort of measuring with the mind, that is ‘to reflect’. 
The word meditation in its general usage in modern society has a number of different 
prominent folk meanings (Varela et al., 1991): 1) a state of concentration in which 
consciousness is focused on only one object; 2) a state of relaxation that is 
psychologically and medically beneficial; 3) a dissociated state in which trance 
phenomena can occur; 4) a mystical state in which higher realities or religious objects 
are experienced.  What is called Buddhist mindfulness/awareness practice is intended to 
be just the opposite of these. Obviously there are different versions of meditation, born 
in different places, within different cultural frames (Lutz et al. 2007), but for my thesis I 
have considered only the secular aspect of it, its translation from the eastern society to 
the Western one – especially Europe and United States – because it seems to be more 
useful from a pedagogical point of view. In fact I will not consider the religious, 
spiritual, ritual or mystical aspects of the meditation even though I am totally aware 
about the important role played by these factors on subjects who learn or teach various 
forms of meditation.  
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Beside all the different historical traditions of meditation, the subject of my 
studies is probably the most common, spread and well-known in our society, and could 
be considered a soft adaptation of stronger eastern meditation tradition, probably more 
easy, useful and at the same time more attractive for Europeans and Americans: 
mindfulness meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 2005; Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 1985). 
“Its purpose is to become mindful, to experience what one’s mind is doing as it does it, 
to be present with one’s mind.” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 23).  To describe what 
mindfulness meditation is we can take a look at what it is not. Usually one notices the 
tendency of the mind to wander only when one is attempting to accomplish some 
mental task and the wandering interferes. Or perhaps one realizes that one has just 
finished an anticipated pleasurable activity without noticing it. “How can this mind 
become an instrument for knowing itself? How can the flightiness, the nonpresence of 
mind be worked with? Traditionally, text talk about two stages of practice: calming or 
taming the mind (Sanscrit: shamatha) and the development of insight (Sanscrit: 
vipashyana). Shamatha, when used as a separate practice, is in fact a concentration 
technique for learning to hold (“tether” is the traditional term) the mind to a single 
object. […] The purpose of calming the mind in Buddhism is not to become absorbed 
but to render the mind able to be present with itself long enough to gain insight into its 
own nature and functioning.” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 24).  
When Varela and colleagues first spoke about ‘embodied cognition’ they were 
referring to the union of cognitive sciences and phenomenology for the theoretical part, 
and mindfulness meditation for the practical one. We can properly say that the origins 
of the ‘embodied theory’ is strictly connected to meditation and, specifically, to 
mindfulness meditation. Indeed, for the embodied approach, the practice and the 
experiential side of the life is important as well as the theoretical one. This assumption 
  28 
is so fundamental that only considering it carefully we can understand the critic that 
Varela addressed to Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty when he wrote that they 
treated deeply and acutely the theme of the experience and the body but they were 
lacking an important point: the practice. Indeed in The Embodied Mind (1991, p. 19) we 
can read that 
“Thus although Husserl’s turn toward a phenomenological 
analysis of experience seemed radical, it was, in fact, quite within the 
mainstream of Western philosophy. Indeed, this criticism would hold 
even for Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, as well as for Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of lived experience. Both stressed the pragmatic, 
embodied context of human experience, but in a purely theoretical way. 
[…] But precisely by being a theoretical activity after the fact, it could 
not recapture the richness of experience; it could be only a discourse 
about that experience. Merleau-Ponty admitted this in his own way by 
saying that his task was infinite”. 
 
At that time Varela was quite critical to some aspect of the phenomenological 
tradition1 but still intrigued in the possibility to close the gap between cognitive 
sciences and the subjective experience. He was convinced that the dialog between 
cognitive sciences and phenomenology was the good theoretical road for that, and the 
mindfulness meditation was just the right practical trait d’union among them.  
Thus there is a very strict link between meditation and consciousness from the 
phenomenological point of view (Fasching, 2008) but there is also a deeper one 
                                                
1 Evan Thompson has recently corrected this initial position of Varela affirming that 
“The Embodied Mind” briefly discussed and criticized Husserlian phenomenology. Although I 
still stand by some of those critical points, I also believe our treatment was too hasty. At the 
time we lacked sufficient knowledge of the depth and breadth of Husserl’s writings. We were 
also influenced by Hubert Dreyfus’s interpretation of Husserl as a cognitivist and proto-
computationalist, an interpretation I no longer accept and that Varela too disavowed in his 
subsequent work on naturalizing phenomenology” (2007, p. 444). 
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between meditation, education and phenomenology (Cavana, 2000; Demetrio, 2000; 
Tarozzi 2002); these links have to be investigated empirically and pedagogically and 
constitutes the core of my thesis.  
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2	  The	  Embodied	  Education	  	  
As I said, my aim is to examine how bodily experience – and in particular  
meditative experience – shapes self-knowledge and the first-person perspective; the aim 
is to introduce the latest developments in these areas to the educational debate, given 
that they are already well spread in other disciplines, from anthropology to philosophy, 
from psychology to neuroscience but not so much in pedagogy (Francesconi 2009a; 
2009b). 
This hybrid and embodied vision of cognition is nowadays current in cognitive 
science and neuroscience – although initially it had been set aside or not taken into 
consideration. It seems to be, from my point of view, highly relevant to education also 
considering the fact that particular attention to the body has always been very present in 
educational sciences, particularly within phenomenological pedagogy (Dallari, 2005, 
pp. 15-91); the effort to create an innovative approach which mixes neurocognitive 
sciences and education, though not yet been set programmatically in dialogue except in 
isolated cases, is quickly growing and offers interesting perspectives for the theoretical 
discussion and empirical research that require more attention from educational scholars 
and that have a position within the actual debate (Fischer, 2009; Fischer, Daniel, 
Immordino-Yang, Stern, Battro, & Koizumi, 2007). It is from this theoretical 
perspective that comes my proposal to think of an Embodied Education as a result 
arising from the intersection of phenomenology and embodied theory. 
My initial interest to a pedagogical approach attentive to the cognitive sciences 
is mainly due to the attendance of the work of Mortari (2002; 2003) and Dallari (2000, 
2005). In particular, in the text Aver cura della vita della mente , a few years ago I 
found a fascinating combination of phenomenological pedagogy and cognitive science 
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and some exciting definitions of concepts such as ‘thought’, ‘cognition’, ‘mind’, 
‘consciousness’, ‘self’, definitions which I have never substantially dropped and which I 
now find very useful, during my PhD course, to develop an epistemological and 
methodological reflection within the current debate on these issues. 
The educational sciences and neurocognitive sciences are gaining more ground 
in common (Fischer et al., 2007), not only to the classical themes of learning, memory 
and attention but also to the theme of consciousness and self, and the bodily dimension 
of the identity. I want to suggest the idea of Embodied Education declining it in two 
ways: a) epistemological, b) empirical: 
a) As we have seen the epistemological roots of my proposal are grounded in the 
embodied theory that is, at its time, a fusion of phenomenology, neurocognitive 
sciences and complexity theory. This is the approach that I refer to, considered from a 
pedagogical perspective. 
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Figure 1 Epistemological structure of the Embodied Education 
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b) The empirical, as we will see more over in the text, as to do with the 
fundamental role of the experience, which surpasses, from a pedagogical point of view, 
the mere role of the body or of the mind taken separately. 
 
 
Figure 2 Empirical structure of the Embodied Education 
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2.1	  Neurocognitive	  aspects	  of	  mindfulness	  meditation	  
Results within the neurocognitive science of meditation are frequently discussed 
with respect to neuroplasticity, as several findings suggest that extended meditation 
training may lead to functional as well as structural changes of the brain (e.g. Davidson, 
Kabat-Zinn, Schumacher, Rosenkranz, Muller, Santorelli, Urbanowski, Harrington, 
Bonus, & Sheridan, 2003; Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman, Gray, Greve, Treadway, McGarvey, 
Quinn, Dusek, Benson, Rauch, Moore, & Fischl, 2005; Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, 
Ricard, & Davidson, 2004; Pagnoni & Cekic, 2007). We will take a look at the most 
interesting results from a pedagogical point of view – and neuroplasticity definitely is 
an interesting topic for educators – with regard to both the structural (neurological) and 
functional (cognitive) aspects of meditation practice.  
 
 
2.1.1	  Neurological	  and	  physiological	  effects	  of	  meditation	  
Empirical research on the effects of meditation began in the 50's and has led to 
various studies. However, neuroscientific studies began in the 90's. There has been 
enormous growth in this sector in recent years and a proliferation of institutes, 
organizations, centers and research programs dedicated exclusively to the study of the 
effects of short or long meditative practices on the central nervous system and on the 
brain specifically. Recently, other studies, from biology to medicine have also 
investigated the effects of meditation on the immune system (Kabat-Zinn 2005; Kabat-
Zinn et al., 1985).  
It is not necessary here to propose a complete review of the dedicated literature; 
instead it seems to be more useful to explore some neurological and physiological 
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consequences of meditation practice which are or could be of some interest from a 
pedagogical point of view. One of the most significant aspects of neuroscientific 
research on meditation in terms of education lies in what is called ‘neuroplasticity’, the 
ability of the brain to change its functions and/or its structure as a result of internal and 
external stimuli, that is experience. The discovery that the brain is able to modify itself 
through ordinary and repeated experiences or lead experiences (as training and learning) 
is rather modern; the previous belief amongst scientists was that the brain does not 
change after the critical period of infancy. Nowadays the huge amount of investigation 
on that is revealing something completely different. The brain is plastic, malleable, 
experience-dependent (Merzenich, 1987, cited in Gallese, 2006). The idea that the 
development and the modulation of the brain structure is experience-based is quite 
revolutionary and new and it is certainly well supported by numerous data. For 
example, neonatal rodents exposed to varying levels of maternal licking and grooming 
develop very different phenotypes and genotypes; the brains of animals are critically 
affected by this differential rearing. Indeed, the gene that codes the glucocorticoid 
receptor is actually changed by such experience (Lutz et al., 2007). In humans, the brain 
of an expert chess player, taxi driver or musician is functionally and structurally 
different from that of a non-expert in each profession. London taxi cab drivers have 
larger hippocampi than matched controls and the amount of time the individual worked 
as a cab driver predicted the size of the posterior hippocampus (Maguire, Gadian, 
Johnsrude, Good, Ashburner, Frackowiak, & Frith, 2000). Further work by this group 
suggests that these differences in hippocampal size are the results of experience and 
training as a cab driver and not a consequence of pre-existing differences in 
hippocampal structure (Maguire, Spiers, Good, Hartley, Frackowiak, & Burgess, 2003).  
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Speaking about meditation, a recent study shows how the brain’s structure 
changes according to meditation training (Lazard et al., 2005). In this study, cortical 
thickness was assessed using magnetic resonance imaging comparing groups with 
different amounts of meditative experience and different ages; the authors found that the 
cortical areas of the brain that are linked to attention, interoception and sensory 
precessing (including the prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula) were thicker in 
subjects who had done 40 minutes of Insight Meditation per day for an average of nine 
years than with matched controls. Cortical thickness could be due to greater arborization 
per neuron, increased glial volume, or increased regional vasculature, all of which are 
important for neural function. These results seem to suggest that learning meditation 
practices affect body-mind wellness, consciousness development and social skills 
development as well as involving a positive functional and structural change in the 
brain. They further suggest that meditation may have an impact on age-related declines 
in cortical structure, and this result is strictly related with what is called today ‘Life-
Long Learning’.  
The effects of meditation on the grey matter are confirmed by Luders and 
colleagues (Luders, Toga, Lepore, & Gaser, 2009) and by Vestergaard-Poulsen and 
colleagues (Vestergaard-Poulsen, van Beek, Skewes, Bjarkam, Stubberup, Bertelsen, & 
Roepstorff, 2009). In these two studies some other brain areas are been investigated but 
the final focus was still on the grey matter. In the first one, using high-resolution MRI 
data of 44 subjects, experts and control groups, authors set out to examine the 
underlying anatomical correlates of long-term meditation. They detected significantly 
larger grey matter volumes in meditators in the right orbito-frontal cortex. In addition, 
meditators showed significantly larger volumes of the right hippocampus. Both orbito-
frontal and hippocampal regions have been implied into emotional regulation and 
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response control. Thus, larger volumes in these regions might account for meditators' 
singular abilities and habits to cultivate positive emotions, retain emotional stability, 
and engage in mindful behavior. They further suggest that these regional alterations in 
brain structures constitute part of the underlying neurological correlate of long-term 
meditation independent of a specific style and practice. 
In the study conducted by Vestergaard-Poulsen and colleagues (Vestergaard-
Poulsen et al., 2009), authors report evidence of structural differences in the lower 
brainstem of participants engaged in the long-term practice of meditation. Using 
magnetic resonance imaging, they observed higher gray matter density in lower brain 
stem regions of experienced meditators compared with age-matched nonmeditators. The 
findings show that long-term practitioners of meditation have structural differences in 
brainstem regions concerned with cardiorespiratory control. According to the authors, 
this could account for some of the cardiorespiratory parasympathetic effects and traits, 
as well as the cognitive, emotional, and immunoreactive impact reported in several 
studies of different meditation practices. We have to consider that the brainstem is very 
different from the cortical areas, both in structure and in functions. Though small, this is 
an extremely important part of the brain as the nerve connections of the motor and 
sensory systems from the main part of the brain to the rest of the body pass through the 
brain stem. This includes the corticospinal tract (motor), the posterior column-medial 
lemniscus pathway (fine touch, vibration sensation and proprioception) and the 
spinothalamic tract (pain, temperature, itch and crude touch). As already mentioned, the 
brain stem also plays an important role in the regulation of cardiac and respiratory 
function. It also regulates the central nervous system, and is pivotal in maintaining 
consciousness and regulating the sleep cycle.  
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Speaking about the electro-physiological functioning of the brain and not about 
cytoarchitectonics, we have to remember that the first studies on meditation were 
carried out in the 80's on the cerebral waves during meditative states; this was the first 
approach to the question, also because at that time, only the EEG (Electro-Encephalo-
Gramma) was available. Since those pioneering studies, much more has been done and I 
want to mention shortly a study and its results which have recently been discovered. As 
reported by Fell and colleagues (Fell, Axmacher, & Haupt, 2010), some 
electrophysiological alterations can be observed on the beginner/student level, which 
are closely related to non-meditative processes. Others seem to correspond to an 
advanced/expert level, and seem to be unique for meditation-related states of 
consciousness. Meditation is one possibility to specialize in brain/mind functions using 
the brain’s immanent neural plasticity. This plasticity is probably recruited by certain 
EEG patterns observed during/or as a result of meditation, for instance, synchronized 
gamma oscillations. While meditation has formerly been understood to comprise mainly 
passive relaxation states, recent EEG findings suggest that meditation is associated with 
active states which involve cognitive restructuring and learning. Expert meditators 
showed a rise in gamma waves which lead to the hypothesis of the brain as maximally 
sensitive consuming less power (Fell et al., 2010). This suggests one of the main effects 
that meditation could have: the relaxation of the brain-body unit is coupled with a better 
functioning of the high-order cognitive functions, that is consciousness and awareness. 
According to Lutz, ‘the meditative traditions provide a compelling example of 
strategies and techniques that have evolved over time to enhance and optimize human 
potential and well-being. The neuroscientific study of these traditions is still in its 
infancy but early findings promise both to reveal the mechanisms by which such 
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training may exert its effects and to underscore the plasticity of the brain circuits that 
underlie complex mental functions (Lutz et al., 2007).  
 
 
2.1.2	  Cognitive	  and	  functional	  effects	  of	  meditation	  
An alternative perspective on meditation practice concerns cognitive, emotional 
and, in general, functional changes resulting from short or extensive meditation 
practice, where meditation is often conceptualized in terms of mental or cognitive 
training (e.g. Cahn & Polich, 2006; Carter, Presti, Callistemon, Ungerer, Liu, & 
Pettigrew, 2005; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). 
The study of the mind has been the object of interest for both Eastern culture 
and Western philosophy and psychology. These two approaches provide different 
perspectives that contribute to a broader understanding of the processes and effects of 
meditation practice. In an attempt to align western psychological and Buddhist thinking  
on this topic, Wallace (2007) provides a framework that facilitates the integration of 
such different perspectives. Drawing from Buddhist sources as well as psychological 
theory and evidence they propose a four-component model, outlining areas for 
development that contribute to overall psychological well-being. According to their 
mental balance model the components conation (motivation, intention), attention, 
cognition and affect/emotion need to be developed and balanced to achieve profound 
well-being. In particular, though not exclusively, the components attention and 
cognition bear a close relationship to mindfulness (see Moore, & Malinowski, 2009), 
which has been conceptualised in terms of self-regulation of attention and orientation 
towards one’s experiences (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, Anderson, Carmody, Segal, 
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Abbey, Speca, Velting, Devins, 2004). Also Kabat-Zinn’s operational definition of 
mindfulness as ‘‘the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the 
present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by 
moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 145) acknowledges these two aspects. Thus, 
mindfulness meditation encompasses various aspects of attention as for instance the 
ability to focus and sustain ones attention and a reduced proneness to distraction. Cahn 
& Polich’s definition of meditation as ‘‘practices that self-regulate the body and mind, 
thereby affecting mental events by engaging a specific attentional set” (Cahn & Polich, 
2006, p. 180), also indicates that training of attentional functions is an essential aspect 
of any form of meditation practice. In a similar way traditional Buddhist texts describe 
the practice of bare attention, the attending ‘‘to the bare facts of perception without 
reacting to them by deed, speech or mental comment”, as a corner stone of mindfulness 
(Wallace, 2007, p. 3). To cultivate mindful awareness, attention needs to be combined 
with a non-judgmental orientation towards an openness for the flow of one’s 
experiences. 
Thus, as we have seen right now, speaking about mindfulness meditation 
implicates speaking about different cognitive functions, as attention, memory, self-
regulation, self-perception, emotional balance, metacognitive skills, well-being etc. But 
depending on different tradition, for instance, we could have a different form of 
attention training: one refers to open attention (OA) and one for the focused attention 
(FA).  These styles are found with some variation in several meditation traditions, 
including Zen, Vipassana and Tibetan Buddhism (Austin, 1999; 2009). Both styles are 
also implied in secular interventions that draw on Buddhist practices, such as 
mindfulness based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1985). The first style, FA meditation, 
entails voluntary focusing attention on a chosen object in a sustained fashion. The 
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second style, OM meditation, involves nonreactively monitoring the content of 
experience from moment to moment, primarily as a means to recognize the nature of 
emotional and cognitive patterns. Here below I have reported two short detailed 
explanations of what they exactly are (Lutz et al., 2008). 
  43 
 
Box 1. FA meditation 
A widespread style of Buddhist practice involves sustaining selective attention 
moment by moment on a chosen object, such as a subset of localized sensations caused by 
respiration. To sustain this focus, the meditator must also constantly monitor the quality of 
attention. At first, the attention wanders away from the chosen object, and the typical 
instruction is to recognize the wandering and then restore attention to the chosen object. For 
example, while intending to focus on localized sensations around the nostrils caused by 
breathing, one might notice that the focus has shifted to the pain in oneʼs knee. One then 
ʻreleasesʼ this distraction, and returns to the intended object. Thus, while cultivating the acuity 
and stability of sustained attention on a chosen object, this practice also develops three skills 
regulative of attention: the first is the monitoring faculty that remains vigilant to distractions 
without destabilizing the intended focus. The next skill is the ability to disengage from a 
distracting object without further involvement. The last involves the ability to redirect focus 
promptly to the chosen object. 
Progress in this form of meditation is measured, in part, by the degree of effort 
required to sustain the intended focus. The novice contends with more distractions, and the 
three regulative skills are frequently exercised. As one advances, the three regulative skills 
can be developed to the point that, for example, advanced practitioners have an especially 
acute ability to notice when the mind has wandered. Eventually, FA induces a trait change, 
whereby the attention rests more readily and stably on the chosen focus. At the most 
advanced levels, the regulative skills are invoked less and less frequently, and the ability to 
sustain focus thus becomes progressively ʻeffortless.ʼ 
In advanced practitioners, FA practices create a sense of physical lightness or vigor, 
and the need for sleep is said to be reduced. Advanced levels of concentration are also 
thought to correlate with a significant decrease in emotional reactivity. FA practices typically 
involve a relatively narrow field of focus, and as a result, the ability to identify stimuli outside 
that field of focus might be reduced. 
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 Box 2. OM meditation 
Although varied, OM practices share several core features, including in particular the 
initial use of FA training to calm the mind and reduce distractions. As FA advances, the well 
developed monitoring skill becomes the main point of transition into OM practice. One aims to 
remain only in the monitoring state, attentive moment by moment to anything that occurs in 
experience without focusing on any explicit object. To reach this state, the practitioner gradually 
reduces the focus on an explicit object in FA, and the monitoring faculty is correspondingly 
emphasized. Usually, there is also an increasing emphasis on cultivating a ‘reflexive’ awareness 
that grants one greater access to the rich features of each experience, such as the degree of 
phenomenal intensity, the emotional tone and the active cognitive schema. 
Although the enhancement of the monitoring awareness con- tinues until no explicit 
focus is maintained, the monitoring itself does not create any new explicit focus. Thus, unlike 
FA, OM involves no strong distinction between selection and deselection. For example, the FA 
monitoring faculty detects the emotional tone of a state as a background feature of the primary 
focus, but in OM the emotional tone is detected without it, or any other object, becoming an 
explicit or primary focus. It is as if emotional tone, the quality of attention, and other such 
phenomenal features remain in the background, even though there is no contrasting cognitive 
fore- ground. In this way, the ‘effortful’ selection or ‘grasping’ of an object as primary focus is 
gradually replaced by the ‘effortless’ sustaining of an awareness without explicit selection. 
This distinction between the ‘effortful’ and the ‘effortless’ points to the contrast 
between skills employed during the state and traits developed as practice progresses. For 
example, initially the practitioner frequently ‘grasps’ objects in a way that requires the skill to 
disengage that focus deliberately; however, eventually a trait emerges such that one can sustain 
the ‘non-grasping’ state, which has no explicit focus. 
A central aim of OM practice is to gain a clear reflexive awareness of the usually 
implicit features of one’s mental life. It is said that awareness of such features enables one more 
readily to transform cognitive and emotional habits. In particular, OM practice allegedly leads 
one to a more acute, but less emotionally reactive, awareness of the autobiographical sense of 
identity that projects back into the past and forward into the future. Finally, heightened 
sensitivity to body and environment occurs with a decrease in the forms of reactivity that create 
mental distress. 
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Referring to the important theme of mind aging and the strategies for facing it – 
theme that has a close connection with the Life-Long Learning theory and Adult 
Education – I want to briefly report a study about the role of meditation practice on age-
related effect of meditation training. In this study (van Leeuwen, Müller, & Melloni, 
2009) the authors explore whether mental training in the form of meditation can help to 
overcome age-related attentional decline. They compared performance on the 
attentional blink task between three populations: a group of long-term meditation 
practitioners within an older population, a control group of age-matched participants 
and a control group of young participants. Members of both control groups had never 
practiced meditation. The results show that long-term meditation practice leads to a 
reduction of the attentional blink. Meditation practitioners taken from an older 
population showed a reduction in blink as compared to a control group taken from a 
younger population, whereas, the control group age-matched to the meditators’ group 
revealed a blink that was comparatively larger and broader. These results support the 
hypothesis that meditation practice can: (i) alter the efficiency with which attentional 
resources are distributed and (ii) help to overcome age-related attentional deficits in the 
temporal domain. 
Let us see now how we can treat meditation from a pedagogical perspective. 
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2.2	  Educational	  aspects	  of	  meditation	  	  
2.2.1	  Learning	  by	  doing:	  meditation	  as	  experiential	  education	  
As I said, the embodied approach is already well developed and broadly used in 
a number of different disciplines: very common within the cognitive neuroscience, 
psychology and philosophy of the mind, useful for the informatics and Artificial 
Intelligence also, well considered in sociology and anthropology as well (Marchand 
2010). In pedagogy and educational sciences, instead, it is not well developed yet. One 
could attribute this lack to the historical negative tradition of pedagogy that consists  in 
staying far from the ‘hot’ scientific debate of every age, moving to safer lands and 
conserving acquired positions. In fact, when I first started to search sources in literature 
about the relationship between education and the embodied approach, it was quite a 
struggle to find something interesting.  
But to me this lack of connection was very surprising for at least three reasons: 
a) there is a huge international phenomenological movement of pedagogy which is 
theoretically just a step away from the embodied theory and the new direction that 
phenomenology took in the last years. Thus that means that sometimes a step can be 
harder than the New York marathon; b) the great interest that pedagogy has always had, 
since the time of Plato, to the bodily and environmentally dimensions of learning; c) the 
great tradition of special education, which has been developed by outstanding scholars 
as Montessori and Vygotskji (Pesci, 2005), who thought that a connection between 
biology and education was necessary but who also thought that an experiential 
dimension of the educational practices was the unavoidable direction of modern 
pedagogy. 
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I have to say that when I began my work I had some doubts about the utility of 
the embodied perspective to pedagogy, and I asked myself what was new in the 
embodied approach that had not been taken into consideration in pedagogy yet. Indeed 
pedagogy and phenomenological pedagogy has very often well considered the 
important role of the body, the environment and the lived experiences in its practice and 
theory (Dallari, 2000; Farnè 2008; Mortari 2002; Tarozzi, 2002). However we have to 
admit that the phenomenological pedagogy movement has never taken suggestions from 
cognitive sciences seriously. But now this new embodied approach, from neuro-
cognitive sciences, is giving new luster to these issues. I am convinced that pedagogy 
has to find its place within what was called ‘mind revolution’ (Gardner, 1987) and also 
‘neuro-revolution’. 
I have already discussed the neurocognitive effects of meditation; let us have a 
closer look now to what I think education can say about meditation. Here the question is 
to consider meditation as a form of learning by doing, that is experiential learning. The 
word experience (ex perior: to try, to understand by doing something repeatedly) has 
always been very important in educational sciences and now, as we have seen, has 
become of a certain interest within cognitive sciences as well. We have to keep in mind 
the subtitle of the book ‘The Embodied Mind’ which is ‘Cognitive Sciences and the 
Human Experience’; indeed, the big step taken by the initial proponents of the 
embodied approach was to put in the center of the discussion both the role of the human 
experience and the subject who goes through that experience, that is the subjective, 
qualitative, phenomenological dimension of the experience itself. 
In phenomenology, experience is not conceived as a modellization of the 
external world, like a cast of the objective reality. Knowledge is not the mirror of nature 
or the manipulation of symbols (Thompson, 2007). What it is interesting for pedagogy 
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is rather that the form of experiencing the reality as a subjective dimension which has a 
meaning – or even more than one – for the subject and has also a shared and 
intersubjective meaning for different subjects. The experiential education that I want to 
present is grounded on Merleau-Ponty’s work. 
What does Merleau-Ponty have to say about learning? Following Standals 
(2009), we can say the follow. First of all we have to stretch that he taught various 
courses in developmental psychology and pedagogy at the university. Indications of 
Merleau-Ponty’s relevance to learning can be found in secondary sources: Jespersen 
(2003) draws on Merleau-Ponty in his critique of both situated learning and Bandura’s 
social-cognitive theory for not properly understanding the role of the body in modelling 
(i.e. learning through observation and imitation) in sports. This critique was later given 
a positive reconstruction when Jespersen (2003) considered Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
the habitual body “as an original structure of learning in every instance, i.e. a kind of 
corporeal grounding in the most personal sense of growth and development” (p. 210). 
A second resource is found in the Skill model of Dreyfus & Dreyfus (cf. 
Dreyfus, 2002), which is a 5-step model for skill acquisition from novice to expert2. 
This model is based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, in particular his notions of 
intentional arc and maximum grip (Dreyfus, 2002). In the model, a development is 
described where the learner moves from being dependent on explicit rules given by a 
teacher/instructor to finally on the expert level being able to act with an “immediate 
                                                
2
 The model has in one text been developed to include a sixth and seventh level: 
mastery and practical wisdom (Dreyfus 2002, p. 373). 
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intuitive situational response” (Dreyfus, 2002: 372). The Skill model is a critique of a 
representationalist’s account of learning. That is, according to the Skill model, the 
expert is capable of action without the need for mental representations: “What one has 
learned appears in the way the world shows up; it is not represented in the mind and 
added on to present experience. That is, according to Merleau-Ponty, what the learner 
acquires through experience is not represented in the mind at all but is presented to the 
learner as a more and more finely discriminated situation, which then solicits a more 
and more refined response “ (Dreyfus 2002, p. 373.). I will not go deeply into  Dreyfus’ 
model; suffice it to say that Dreyfus (2002) gives us a clear indication that learning, 
although perhaps not an explicit concern of Merleau- Ponty, is a theme that can be read 
out of his work.   
Merleau-Ponty’s first work, The structure of behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1963), 
contains a critique of behaviourism, and as such is the place where Merleau-Ponty most 
explicitly deals with learning. However, apart from this critique of behaviourism, one 
could say that learning is a theme implicitly occupying Merleau-Ponty to some degree 
in Phenomenology of perception. The essential function of perception, for Merleau- 
Ponty, “is to lay the foundations of, or inaugurate, knowledge” (2002, p. 19). Could we 
not say that learning in one sense is to inaugurate knowledge? In addition, throughout 
his work, Merleau-Ponty carves out a third position between empiricism and 
intellectualism. He thus states: “Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we 
are looking for, otherwise we could not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see 
that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again, we should not 
be searching. They are in agreement that neither can grasp consciousness in the act of 
learning” (2002, p. 33). 
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In The structure of behavior, Merleau-Ponty engages at length with learning. At 
the time of writing (the end of the 1930's), contemporary learning theory in psychology 
was more or less synonymous with behaviourism, a theory that tried to explain the 
acquisition of new behaviour by linking an external stimulus to the release of a given 
response. Between stimulus and response there exists only external and causal relations: 
“Learning and development... only transfer to certain stimuli the 
power of releasing certain movements, the motor conditions of which are 
considered as given in advance. The development of behavior consists 
only in different associations of pre-existing elements [...]. The 
conditioned reflex theory presents stimulations and responses which 
succeed each other in an organism like a series of events external to 
each other and between which no relations can be established other than 
those of immediate temporal contiguity (1963, pp. 94-95). 
 
Merleau-Ponty notes a distinction, which is not taken into account by 
behaviourism, namely that between (i) the physical event that the stimulus in itself is, 
and (ii) the situation taken as a whole for the organism, in which the physical event is 
just one part. For behaviourism it is only (i) that can explain behaviour: It is the 
external, physical event that causally leads to the release of behaviour. For the 
behaviourists, (ii) would merely be an explanation attributed to the situation by a human 
observer. For Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, the situation taken as a whole is not 
something merely attributed to the compound of stimuli, because these stimuli are 
integrated into structural processes that play a regulating role: “they establish a relation 
of meaning between situation and response [...] It is to the extent that relations of this 
kind emerge and become efficacious by themselves that the progress of behavior is 
explicable” (1963, p. 103). 
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What is brought forth here is a critique of the atomism that lies at the heart of 
behaviourism, where any situation could be – indeed had to be – decomposed into its 
constitutive parts in order to find the stimulus/stimuli that causally lead to the release of 
behaviour. Against atomism Merleau-Ponty evokes the notions of “form” or “structure” 
that he takes from the Gestalt psychologists3. As opposed to atomism, Gestalt 
psychology holds that the whole of a system is not equivalent to the sum of its isolated 
parts, but are rather “defined as total processes which may be indiscernible from each 
other while their ‘parts’, compared to each other, differ in absolute size... the systems 
are defined as transposable wholes” (1963, p. 47). The notion of gestalt, or structure, 
serves us, according to Merleau-Ponty, better in understanding how a relation of 
meaning is established not between the stimulus and the response, but between the total 
situation and the response. 
A second critical point is that behaviourism places the stimuli and the response 
after one another in a linear, temporal process. The stimulus and the response are two 
externally linked moments following each other in time. Merleau-Ponty questions this 
linear relation: “Situation and reaction are linked internally by their common 
participation in a structure in which the mode of activity proper to the organism is 
expressed. Hence they cannot be placed one after the other as cause and effect” (1963, 
p. 130). Behaviour, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a matter of external causation between 
two isolated events, but rather an internal participation in the structure of a situation. 
                                                
3 
 It is interesting to note that the French word structure is usually used to 
translate Gestalt from German to French (Priest, 1998). This gives a clear meaning of 
what kind of structure Merleau-Ponty investigates in The structure of behavior. 
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What Merleau-Ponty questions is the conceptualization of time employed by 
behaviourism: 
[Behavior] does not unfold in objective time and space like a 
series of physical events; each moment does not occupy one and only one 
point in time; rather, at the decisive moment of learning, a “now” stands 
out from the series of “nows”, acquires a particular value and 
summarizes the groupings which have preceded it as it engages and 
anticipates the future of the behavior (1963, p. 125). 
The concept of time in behaviourism is an objective time where each second 
disinterestingly overtakes the previous one. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, calls 
attention to lived time, in which the decisive now summons the past in a projection 
towards the future. Thus, Merleau-Ponty takes behaviour and learning out of the order 
of strict objectivity and sees them as a projection outside the organism of a possibility 
which is internal to it. The world, in as much as it harbors living beings, ceases to be a 
material plenum consisting of juxtaposed parts; it opens up a place where behavior 
appears (1963, p. 125). 
Through his critique of behaviourism, Merleau-Ponty shows how organisms – 
both animals and human beings – react to the total constellations of a situation, rather 
than to isolated physical or chemical stimuli. If behaviourism was successful in 
isolating certain stimuli that produced given responses, this was only possible in the 
conditions found in the laboratory setting. The conditions of life are different, because 
here the organism displays “a sort of prospective activity” (2002, p. 4), not reckoned 
with in laboratory conditions. This means that the organism, e.g. the human body, does 
not wait for external forces to set it in motion, but rather orients itself towards the 
meaning of the current situation. As we will see, the idea to use qualitative methods to 
investigate the ‘real’ embodied-embedded practice of meditation fits well with the effort 
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to capture the subjective perspective and the meaning attribution to the actual 
experience, as indicated by Merleau-Ponty.   
The critique of behaviouristic conception of learning has so far been a negative 
one. But Merleau-Ponty also points to a positive description of learning. Contra 
behaviourism Merleau-Ponty says that “to learn never consists in being capable of 
repeating the same gesture” (1963, p. 96), for instance pressing levers to get food or 
finding a way through a maze, as the animals in the behaviourists’ experiments had to 
do. Rather, to learn consists of “providing an adapted response to the situation with 
different means” (ibid.). To learn is not to be able to repeat the same gesture over and 
over again. Rather there must be something involved, which is more flexible than 
automatic responses: “There must be a principle in the organism which ensures that the 
learning experience will have a general relevance” (1963, p. 99). Later, Merleau-Ponty 
would say that “my body is that meaningful core which behaves like a general function, 
and which nevertheless exists, and is susceptible to disease” (2002, p. 170). One way of 
understanding what this general principle or function is, involves attending to Merleau-
Ponty’s notions of body and habit, which I discussed before. 
So, the act of learning is an act that happens in to the lived experience, an 
experience where the body is central, even when it is not in motion as in meditation. 
The issue here is that it is not necessary to always create new experiences where we can 
stand in front of new and amazing objects but it is rather preferable to recognize and 
appreciate the surprise inherent in everyday objects, allowing for usual surprises 
(Mortari, 2002, p. 228). It is a work on oneself that needs to be done, a work of crafting 
its sensitivity and its ability to be surprised. In this sense we can say that experiential 
education through meditation aims to educate the perceptual sensitivity – and the 
description/interpretation of the experience by an embodied self – as a proper and 
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refined way of feeling the world; this is exactly the opposite of the bulimic attitude 
toward every new objects to replace each other lacking the inner value of the self-world 
relationship. Phenomenology and meditation are methods for learning to live in the 
Lebeswelt, in the lived world, through a sort of passive behavior that allow the things to 
show their own nature, going back to the things themselves. 
Even though there is no literature about how and why meditation can by 
considered as a practice of experiential learning, meditation is very often declined in a 
pedagogical manner, in schools as well as in business companies. From my point of 
view mindfulness meditation can be considered as experiential learning because it has 
the basic characteristics of every experiential education experience and setting (Beard & 
Wilson, 2006):     
• It is done out of the formal educational system and out of its settings, like a 
classroom (even though it is getting more and more in to it in the past few 
years); 
• It is a practical/physical activity; 
• There is a notable role of reflexive practice in experience; 
• Its aims are deeply pedagogical: self knowledge; self development; well being; 
social skills; ethical skills.    
 
Getting closer to how meditation can be considered a form of ‘learning by 
doing’, we can take a look at the didactical structure of a meditation session or lesson. 
Considering some suggestions by the literature (Varela et al., 1991) and what I collected 
with my studies, we can say that typically mindfulness/awareness is trained by means of 
formal periods of sitting meditation, where the experience itself consists of nothing else 
than sitting and breathing. The purpose of such a period is to simplify the situation to 
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the bare minimum. The body is put into an upright posture and held still. Some simple 
object, often the breath, is used as the focus of alert attention. Each time the meditator 
realizes that his mind is wandering unmindfully, he is to acknowledge nonjudgmentally 
that wandering (there are various instructions as to how this is to be done) and bring the 
mind back to its object. Breathing is one of the most simple, basic, ever-present bodily 
activities but it does not seem to be the easiest (we will see that much better in the 
results’ section). Yet beginning meditators are generally astonished at how difficult it is 
to be mindful of an even so uncomplex object. Meditators discover that mind and body 
are not coordinated. The body is sitting and usually not perfectly still, but the mind is 
seized constantly by thoughts, feelings, inner conversations, daydreams, fantasies, 
sleepiness, opinions, theories, judgments about thoughts and feelings, judgments about 
judgments – a never-ending torrent of disconnected mental events that the meditators do 
not even realize are occurring except at those brief instants when they remember what 
they are doing. Even when they attempt to return to their object of mindfulness, the 
breath, they may discover that they are only thinking about the breath rather than being 
mindful of the breath. As we will see, meditation is a practice that, differently from 
other physical activities, deeply involve the phenomenological mind, the subjective 
enquire about what is going on during the meditative session. The request to stay still 
and focus only on the breath is not only quite unusual, especially for Western people, 
but also completely surprising both in a positive and negative way. 
The best proof of meditation, especially mindfulness meditation, as education is 
just that through a bodily activity the mind gets definitely surprised, awakened, 
questioned (Mortari 2002); thrown in an unusual condition of uncertainty, which could 
be a stall but instead it pedagogically and cognitively is a resource (Dallari, 2002; 
2006). The subject has to face a situation where a falsely simple physical experience 
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turns into a truly complex mental one. With the risk for the subject to lose control on it. 
In this case the back-and-forth dialectic between the bodily and mental dimensions is 
necessary to the subject to try not to get control over the situation but to find personal 
accommodation on it and, then, an interpretation of it. To become mindful means 
exactly that: to know what is going on to me at a specific moment, letting it go on 
without trying to get mental control of it, letting it happen and staying in the flow of 
consciousness without judgments. The interesting question here is to see how the 
process of becoming mindful happens through the meditative learning process.  
What do we learn when we study to meditate? This is a question to which I tried 
to answer with my study but for now let’s see the model of mindful learning offered by 
Langer. The Langer’s study of mindful learning offers us a view of “mindfulness” that 
has elements that appear on the surface both similar and distinct from the thousands of 
years of the practice of mindful awareness. In Langer’s own words (1989; 1997, p. 111) 
“When we are mindful, we implicitly or explicitly 1) view a situation from several 
perspectives, 2) see information presented in the situation as novel, 3) attend to the 
context in which we are perceiving the information, and eventually 4) create new 
categories through which this information may be understood.” For Langer these 
features of multiple perspectives, novelty, context and new categories are the essence of 
mindful learning; we will see that some categories that I found in my study converge 
with this model and that some others differ from it.    
 Baer and colleagues propose another model. Mindfulness training has been 
operationalized to reach some learning goals (Baer et al. 2006): 1) nonreactivity to inner 
experience; 2) observing/noticing/attending to sensations, perceptions, thoughts, 
feelings; 3) acting with awareness/not on automatic pilot/concentration/nondistraction; 
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4) describing/labeling with words; 5) nonjudgmental of experience. These can be 
summarized with the words: nonreact, observe, actaware, describe and nonjudge. Also 
some of these categories are similar to the ones I found. 
With regards to didactical structure of meditation schools or courses, I will start 
doing research just on this in a few weeks time so I will not examine this issue here. 
Just consider that meditation courses are offered to the public mostly in an informal 
way, through flyers, announcements and so on. They take place in informal places 
through lessons given by informal teachers. As I said, being meditation training and 
informal learning, the settings and social contexts where it is possible to try this 
experience are usually vague and various. However, here below I have described the 
most important educational and social settings and environments where meditation is 
actually employed – rarely – and where it could be employed in the future. 
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Figure 3 Contexts where meditation is already used 
Meditation	  training	  courses	  
Professional	  Sport	  
Professional	  training	  (rare)	  
Schools	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  and	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  environments	  
Leisure	  activities	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Figure 4 Contexts where meditation could be used or improved 
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2.2.2	  On	  becoming	  aware:	  educating	  the	  mind	  
Within Zen’s tradition it is common to say that consciousness will always be 
one degree above comprehensibility. This concept is close to the one that I have already 
presented in the text about the difference between the pre-reflective self-consciousness 
and the reflective self-consciousness. There is an unreachable level of being aware that 
consists in the fact that there is a gap between being conscious and describing and 
comprehending the states of consciousness; but who works within the educational field 
knows that the real problem doesn’t concern the level of consciousness of a subject, his 
ability to be aware; this is just the first step that an educator has to take when facing this 
question. The real problem is related to the conditions for a development of the 
awareness, that is the pedagogical condition to allow the subject to make a step, from a 
level of competence to another level of competence. This is development (Fischer 2009; 
Fischer, & Bidell 2006). This is what ‘becoming aware’ means; not ‘being’ aware but 
‘becoming’ is really pedagogical. 
How is it that mindfulness/awareness can be developed? What I suggest, 
bringing back the teachings of great masters, is that mindfulness can be considered a 
skill among others, like reading, writing or something else, and its development has to 
be treated as the others; in the case of mindfulness attitude, it can be also considered a 
training of good habits because there is an ethical question that cannot be avoided. I will 
consider this point later in the text. The mental fact of mindfulness is being 
strengthened like the training of a muscle that can then perform harder and longer work 
without getting tired easily. Moreover, awareness is considered part of the basic nature 
of the mind, which has been temporarily obscured by habitual patterns of grasping and 
delusion but that can be developed, as well as every natural potential that human beings 
have. “As all these habits are cut through and one learns an attitude of letting go, the 
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mind’s natural characteristic of knowing itself and reflecting its own experience can 
shine forth. This is the beginning of wisdom or maturity (prajna).” (Varela et al., 1991, 
p. 26) Thus the questions are: can we educate consciousness? How? For what attains my 
thesis, the answer is yes to the first (Depraz, 2006; Depraz et al., 2003; Lutz et al., 2008; 
Varela et al. 1991; Siegel, 2007; 2010;), and through meditation (not exclusively) yes to 
the second.  
As we will see in the data’s chapter, the difference between the self reports of 
expert meditators and the self reports of beginning meditators is a good set of indicators 
to understand which way we have to go to better improve awareness. Some of them 
have to do with the linguistic barrier that subjects face when describing inner 
experiences, indeed one of the main problem for consciousness is to translate the inner 
experience into linguistically formulated concepts, but with a training process that 
becomes easier, as we see from my data. Some others are related to the atomistic 
perception of consciousness as states of consciousness versus the fluid and harmonic 
perception of consciousness as a flow of consciousness (Siegel, 2007); another one is 
related to the different role played by the body; one more consists of nonjudging the 
experience itself, letting it go; and so on.  
Education for becoming aware is not (usually) done at school, but we see that 
the informal proposal made by informal schools and courses attracts more and more 
adults as if the educational settings for the development of awareness were deeply 
intriguing for adult people. And this certainly is. The ability of being aware is strictly 
related to the conduction, interpretation and comprehension of the daily, ordinary, 
normal life. What people learn during meditative courses is nothing miraculous or 
transcendental – at least within mindfulness meditation courses – but it is something 
very concrete and pragmatic, that is the way to stay in the Lebenswelt; people usually 
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learn to look at the world in a different way, changing their gaze, and so switching from 
experience to lived experience, where the subject is fully present and can better 
appreciate what is going on. Indeed, a trained mind realizes that being present to the 
world and to itself means being present to the present moment, with great awareness of 
the temporal dimension of the life of the mind. This does not imply the necessity to 
avoid the metacognitive or narrative attitude; on the contrary metacognition is a 
strategic cognitive activity necessary to recollect the events in a meaningful order, 
taking a break from the actual and direct connection to the material world and re-
creating sense it makes to experience (Dallari, 2000). What I mean is that  
metacognition can not substitute  awareness but it has to be considered as a sort of 
support. I mean that it is necessary to be aware, present, and mindful in everything one 
is doing, saying, thinking or reflecting. Being there, where we are. 
Indeed there is the fundamental question of the development of the first-person 
perspective (FPP): the capacity to ascribe meaning to factual short-term events, physical 
and mental, that occur during the meditative experience and lead to the development of 
the self identity within a long-term perspective. This is tantamount to a 
phenomenological chronicling of the construction of self in relationship to the body, 
and to the emotions and feelings that emerge in the process (Dallari, 2000; Damasio, 
2000). In this case, there are two points we need to take into consideration: bodily 
consciousness and the bodily self. By ‘bodily consciousness’ I mean the immediate and 
direct nature of lived experience, an integrated and dynamic brain-body process 
(Thompson, & Varela, 2001; Edelman, & Tononi, 1998), the ability to detect the 
physical and mental processes during the experience of meditation and to describe them 
as closely as possible immediately after the experience itself. In this case, the focus is 
on ‘what’ happens and ‘how’ it happens during the flow of time.  
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By the ‘bodily self’ I mean the narrative aspect of identity linked to the body, 
that is, the ability to represent one’s self and one’s own lived body beyond the single 
body experience, even if in connection with it, according to a wider time span (Dallari 
2000; Ricoeur 2002). The specific aim of mindfulness meditation, according to Varela 
and colleagues (1991), lies in the ability to develop ‘presence in the moment’, that is the 
ability to be aware of the dynamic flow of consciousness and experience. As they write 
(1991, p. 37), “mindfulness means that the mind is present in embodied everyday 
experience; mindfulness techniques are designed to lead the mind back from its theories 
and preoccupations, back from the abstract attitude, to the situation of one’s experience 
itself.” Nevertheless, as we will see in the next chapter, meditative practices always 
include some re-cognition activities, as the request to describe the meditative experience 
as it happens – which is the same question I asked the participants to my study. Long-
term meditators develop an attitude of reflexive thought about their ongoing experience. 
According to Shapiro, Carlson et al. (2006), mindfulness practice can accompany a 
perspectival shift which allows a person to step back and ‘reperceive’ his/her own 
experience in a less reactive and judgmental way. Typically, the student inculcates 
mindfulness/awareness in periods of ‘formal’ sitting meditation. 
The way in which the mind reacts to these kinds of bodily experiences and the 
ways in which subjects control themselves and their minds are very interesting topics 
for the cognitive and education sciences. Perception and meta-awareness of the flow of 
consciousness are two of the goals of mindfulness meditation and are usually developed 
over long-term meditation practice. This is a learning process that needs to be studied, 
both from phenomenological and educational perspectives.   
As well as other cognitive functions as writing, reading, speaking, calculating 
and so on, being aware is something that can be learnt, can be improved. This is what I 
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mean when it comes to learning consciousness. Learning consciousness is the 
consciousness that learns to be in contact with reality, that is to be able to stay in the 
flow of experience without losing the ability to understand what is going on. This is not 
only an attitude that comes from meditative practice; this is also an attitude that can be 
improved through the phenomenological method. But we have to admit that this 
pedagogical work on consciousness is not something present in the didactical programs 
and activities at school or, if it is, it is quite rare.  
Following Thompson’s suggestion about the division between static and genetic 
phenomenology, I would like to consider genetic phenomenology from a pedagogical 
point of view (Thompson 2007, p.29) (figure 6) definitely as the best option if 
compared to static phenomenology (figure 5) to describe and express the ‘learning 
consciousness’, that is the possibility to develop, change and improve the way in which 
the consciousness tends toward the object (idem). Indeed  
“static phenomenology analyzes the formal structures of 
consciousness, whereby consciousness is able to constitute (disclose or 
bring to awareness) its object. Static phenomenology takes these 
intentional structures and their correlative objects as given and analyzer 
them statically or synchronically. Genetic phenomenology is concerned 
with how these intentional structures and objects emerge through time; 
there, it cannot take them as given. Instead, it analyzed how certain types 
of experience motivate later and more complex types – for example, how 
implicit and prereflective experiences motivate attentive and reflective 
experiences. From the perspective of genetic phenomenology, experience 
has a sedimented structure, and the process of sedimentation needs to be 
understood in relation to the lived body and time-consciousness.” (2007, 
p. 17)  
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Thus, the structure of the I-object relationship is a dynamical relationship that 
occurs through lived experiences ant it can be active or passive (Thomspon 2007, pp.29-
30): 
a) Active genesis: “In active genesis subjects play an active and deliberate, 
productive role in the constitution of objects. The products of active genesis are 
tools, artworks, scientific theories, experimental interventions, logical 
judgments, mathematical propositions, and so on. Active genesis, however, 
always presupposes a passivity where one is affected beforehand.” 
b) Passive genesis: “It must be stressed that “passive” in this context does not mean 
a state of inactivity, but rather a state of being involuntarily influenced and 
affected by something. In particular, it means being influenced and affected on 
an aesthetic level, in the original Greek sense of aesthesis as sense perception, 
especially including perception and felt experience of what is attractive and 
unattractive.” 
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Figure 5 Static phenomenology 
 
 
Figure 6 Genetic phenomenology 
 
 
Noesis	   Noema	  
Noesis	   Noema	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Following these phenomenological suggestions, we can say that the learning 
consciousness can be trained on at least three different levels of skills:  
a) Ability to read the structure of the object/noema; 
b) Ability to read the meaning of the noema; 
c) Ability to read the structure of the consciousness itself; 
a) The first point, among others, has been typically developed by the proponents of 
the so-called descriptive phenomenology (Applebaum, 2007; Giorgi, 1975; 
2009). From their perspective the interpretation of the object and its emotional 
effect on the subject were less interesting than the ‘pure’ description of it. 
b) The second one has to do more with the hermeneutical tradition of 
phenomenology, where the interpretation of what the object means is 
fundamental. (Moustakas, 1994; Van Manen, 1990). 
c) The third one has to do with phenomenology itself, and also with the 
metacognitive and narrative theories that derive from the cognitive sciences and 
learning theories. In this case the important thing is to be able to read not only 
the object or its effects on the person but also and especially the mind’s posture 
(Mortari, 2002), that is how the person usually acts – the act of consciousness- 
when encountering objects. The metacognitive questions in this case are: do I 
have any scheme, any pattern, any strategy that I can recognize in my 
consciousness? 
 
A good testimony of the importance to gain awareness of our own mental 
presence, that is to become aware in daily life is as follows. Epstein (2001, p. 64) wrote: 
“Musical practice has had a different influence. Because I trained first as a musician, 
then later as a physician I was surprised in my otherwise excellent medical education by 
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a striking lack of attention to the self of the practitioner. In contrast, in music study, 
which can be as theoretically and technically complex as any medical specialty, the self 
of the performer is an object of constant study and reflection”. This lack of attention to 
the self and consciousness is huge both in schools and in professional/work settings and 
needs to be more carefully discussed and investigated by pedagogy. Meditation is an 
educational method just for that. 
 
 
2.2.3	  A	  reflective	  mind:	  self,	  metacognition,	  and	  narrative	  	  
It is common to think at Buddhism or Zen as methods to dissolve the mind, the 
intentionality and the will. In those cultures there is a concept, called ‘Wu-Wei’, which 
means ‘no-mind’ and which refers to the effort to reduce the presence of the intellect in 
action (Lutz et al., 2007). The mind could interfere with the fluidity of action, it could 
reduce its smoothness and its precision, that is the reason why there are some techniques 
– in martial arts, meditative practices, gardening, painting, writing and so on – used 
very often in Buddhism or Zen schools; the aim of these techniques relies on developing 
the presence of the mind in the ongoing action, an action that does not depend on the 
mental ability to plan it and execute it, but instead on the strict and deep connection 
between the mind and the body, where often the mind just follows the stream of the 
action. To reduce the presence of the mind and to implement the ‘natural action’ does 
not mean to avoid or refuse any reflective and metacognitive attitude. On the contrary, 
the reflexive attitude is necessary to develop an ongoing mind. 
Embracing multiple perspectives has the quality of a metacognitive skill. In this 
metacognitive view we can then see perspective as not only a changing frame of 
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reference but also one that needs to be considered in viewing the situationally embedded 
meaning of knowledge. Mindful awareness has at its essence metacognitive 
development (Siegel 2007; 2010). We become aware of awareness, can think about 
thinking, attend to intention. All of these dimensions of mindful learning are supported 
by present orientation on the level of information processing and self-relevance in 
learning. This orientation to the present feels like a completely consistent frame of 
being aware of the present moment with the more rigorously developed mindful 
awareness that emerges with training in a mindful awareness practice. Mindful 
awareness may be trained with deep practice and mindful learning may be evoked 
rapidly in a teaching setting. (Siegel, 2007, p. 242) 
Long-term meditators develop an attitude of reflexive thought about their 
ongoing experience. According to Shapiro, Carlson et al. (2006), mindfulness practice 
can accompany a perspectival shift that allows a person to step back and ‘reperceive’ 
his/her own experience in a less reactive and judgmental way.   
Metacognitive skill has the aim to introduce the subject to his own mental life 
gaining control on it; this is a part of mindfulness teaching that cannot be 
underestimated: “The purpose of calming the mind in Buddhism is not to become 
absorbed but to render the mind able to be present with itself long enough to gain 
insight into its own nature and functioning” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 24). That is what 
Varela and colleagues make the point about the connection between meditation and 
metacognition. The metacognitive activity refers to the ability of being aware, control, 
chance and develop ones own cognitive functions as remembering, speaking, 
interpreting, making decisions and judgments, ethic, self perception and so on. As 
Varela used to say, the consciousness is the ability of the system to question the system 
itself, and this is a metacognitive skill. 
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Also Tarozzi expresses the need to think of meditation – mindful and Buddhism 
meditation – not only as attentional training for the awareness of the present moment 
but also as a method to develop the metacognitive skills, that is how the subject thinks 
about his own mind, and the ethical attitude thorough narrative. Tarozzi makes clear 
how the narrative competence – strictly related to metacognition (Dallari, 2000) – is 
essential in Eastern practices. Indeed Eastern philosophy seems to recall the subject to a 
personal responsibility for self education, and the narrative skills are at the base of this 
responsability:  
“Il rischio, infatti, è quello di ridurre le direzioni 
dell’intenzionalità autoriflessiva e narrativa implicite nel Buddismo alla 
sola dimensione della meditazione e lasciare in ombra altre dimensioni 
implicitamente o esplicitamente narrative, e di conseguenza anche 
autoformative, della visione buddista. Il Buddismo è in sé un processo 
che è legittimo definire di autoeducazione, è essenzialmente un processo 
di emancipazione dell’individuo.“(Tarozzi, 2002, p. 18) 
 
In Buddhism, especially in the Mayana tradition, the narrative is essential for 
developing a right attitude toward self knowledge and self education; for doing that 
meditators have to understand that the relation of thinking-speaking-doing is not so 
hierarchic but complementary; when we ask which is the causal mechanism between 
thinking, speaking, acting the Eastern tradition answers that there is not a linear causal 
effect but we have to think in a circular way, a reciprocal causation between the mind 
and the body and often the body and action precede the mind and the thought. In 
Tarozzi (2002, pp. 20-21) we read: 
“Questo processo ribalta la successione tradizionale che vuole 
l’agire come conseguenza del comprendere e la verbalizzazione di 
quella comprensione come stadio intermedio, che prelude e consente 
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l’azione. Prima si comprende, poi se ne può parlare, infine si può fare. 
Su questa successione, comprendre-dire-fare, si basano, ad esempio, 
tutti i processi educativi formalizzati, ma anche l’impianto etico-
giuridico occidentale, così come la tradizione scientifico-tecnologica. In 
definitiva la modernità si è costruita su questa successione. Per questo 
risulta particolarmente rischioso e avventuroso per un occidentale 
moderno accettare che la consapevolezza, e contestualmente, il 
cambiamento del proprio destino o karma, avvenga secondo una 
sequenza inversa: fare-dire-comprendere. L’esperienza, l’agire, precede 
le parole e queste anticipano i pensieri. Ascoltare un insegnamento da 
parte di un maestro (tutti i sutra mahayana iniziano con la frase di rito 
“così ho udito”), significa innanzitutto agirlo, metterlo in pratica. 
Attraverso il racconto di quell’esperienza vissuta agli altri (e quindi a se 
stesso) il buddista comprende, interiorizza, dà senso a ciò che gli è 
accaduto e lo razionalizza, per raccontarlo nuovamente, con una diversa 
coscienza e la capacità di cogliere il modo più efficace per raggiungere 
il cuore dell’interlocutore. 
 
Thus action seems not only to follow thought or language as in a linear 
hierarchical model where it should be the effect of supposed higher-level causes;  action 
has its own ‘life’, its own autonomy and power to lead thought and language and to help 
the subject to learn, reflectively.  
It is also necessary to recall the fact that metacognition and narrative 
competence have social and interactive dimensions that have to be taken into 
consideration within the educational context, avoiding in this way a solipsistic or mystic 
version of meditation. 
“Dunque la meditazione e più in generale la pratica buddista, e 
qui mi riferisco a chi ha intrapreso un cammino di emancipazione 
personale come scelta di vita e non a chi si limita a trascorrere qualche 
fine settimana in un tempio a meditare, anche quando sono finalizzate al 
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lavoro di scavo e di approfondimento dell’interiorità, conducono ad una 
zona nelle profondità del sé, che diventa inessenziale colonizzare 
completamente con la ragione, che rimanda necessariamente agli altri. 
Il significato della narrazione ha pertanto in definitiva 
un’ineliminabile e fortissima valenza sociale e intersoggettiva. Nel senso 
che la narrazione di sé nel Buddismo Mahayana non può prescindere 
dal fatto di dire di sé ad un altro. Questo è lo spirito della figura del 
Bodhisattva che domina prepotentemente la visione moderna del 
Buddismo. È un raccontarsi agli altri per testimoniare attraverso prove 
concrete la grandezza dell’insegnamento, il potere della fede, i 
cambiamenti avvenuti nella realtà di vita, la propria rivoluzione 
umana”. (Tarozzi 2002, p. 25) 
 
Thus we don’t have to think about the meditative and inner experience only as a 
solipsistic experience; indeed, there is a very important role of social attitude in 
meditation that has to be taken into consideration. Tarozzi (2002, p. 29) again explains 
how  
“In conclusione, quindi, il significato della narrazione di sé nel 
Buddismo si inscrive in un contesto dinamico, evolutivo, della storia 
della persona: non è una fotografia statica del presente, non è un dirsi 
autocontemplativo, né un dirsi introspettivo, solipsisitico, quanto 
piuttosto il dire di un percorso evolutivo che mostra la potenzialità 
emancipativa e trasformativa intrinseca a ogni individuo. Parlare di sé 
delineando il percorso è parte integrante della pratica: tanto della 
pratica per sé (la liturgia), quanto della pratica per gli altri 
(condividere, incoraggiare, sostenere). Il valore della mia esperienza è 
infinito se può essere ispirazione per gli altri in un lavoro di 
interpretazione infinita e, come si è visto, non può essere altrimenti.”
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3	   Transforming	   the	   first-­‐person	   perspective:	   self-­‐
consciousness	  and	  the	  embodied	  experience	  of	  meditation	  	  
3.1	  Methods	   for	   consciousness:	   qualitative	  methodological	   issues	  
for	  studying	  the	  embodied	  mind	  
In qualitative research it is fundamental to clarify the epistemological 
assumptions from which one operates. The paradigm for research, as defined by Denzin 
and Lincoln (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 157) is a "basic set of beliefs that guides 
action" that describes the principles driving the world view of the researcher and his 
work. Research methodology is the phenomenological methodology which falls into the 
field of naturalistic epistemology (Mortari, 2007; Moustakas, 1994; Tarozzi, 1997). 
Phenomenology is both a research philosophy and a research methodology which may 
be regarded as the study of intentional consciousness, that is the way in which 
consciousness constitutes the objects and itself. The phenomenological motto of 'going 
back to the same way' means to put in brackets (Epoché) (Tarozzi, 1997) prejudices and 
judgments and look at the experience in a direct way with the sole intent to capture 
one’s appearance: 'Phenomenology is concerned with attaining an understanding and 
proper description of the experiential structure of our mental/embodied life' (Gallagher, 
2008, p. 9). In qualitative research this is valid not only for the participants but for the 
researchers too.  
The phenomenological research tradition – especially in psychology and 
educational sciences – has already largely discussed the problem of how to investigate 
the subjective experience, and it has developed some different versions suited to analyze 
the phenomena of the mind. It has to be noted that the definition of a precise and 
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rigorous method to collect data in first-person perspective is at the heart of current 
research programs in embodied cognitive sciences also from which this study derives. 
Considerable importance was attached from the beginning to this hybrid field between 
phenomenology and cognitive sciences to the so-called first-person method and second-
person method for the investigation of the consciousness and the lived experience 
(Depraz et al., 2003; Overgaard, 2008; Varela, 1996; Varela, & Shear, 1999; Varela, et 
al., 1991; Zahavi, 2005). As Chris Frith says: ‘A major programme for 21st century 
science will be to discover how an experience can be translated into a report, thus 
enabling our experiences to be shared’ (Frith, 2002). The interest not only in study but 
also in the development of first-person perspective on the subjective experience is at the 
basis of this study, and the proposal to make the subjects repeat several times the same 
experience and the description of it is one of the strategies for stabilizing the reports. 
There are some different phenomenological methods to which I referred for my 
studies; some of them are closer to psychology and education (Giorgi, 2009; Moustakas, 
1994; Van Manen, 1990) some others are closer to cognitive sciences (Lutz et al., 2002; 
Petitmengin, 2006; 2010; Hurlburt, & Heavey 2001; 2004; 2006; Shear, & Varela, 
1999; 1999a); a further distinction can be made between the last: in fact Lutz’s and 
Petitmengin’s methods provide preliminary training to the subjects through repeated 
experiences to help them to identify verbal and conceptual categories that best define 
their experience (Le Van Quyen, & Petitmengin, 2002; Lutz et al., 2002; Lutz, & 
Thompson, 2003; Petitmengin, 2006; 2010); instead Hurlburt and Heavey provide a 
method for the immediate, intuitive and naive approach of the subject to his own 
experience, an approach that can change in consequence to a repeated experience but 
not with a guide or predetermined specific training (Heavey, & Hurlburt, 2008; 
Hurlburt, & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt, & Heavey, 2001; 2004; 2006). However, all the 
  76 
phenomenological methods have a common presupposition that is well explained by 
Mortari and Tarozzi (2010, p. 8) 
Therefore, what a phenomenologist uses in the research are not 
facts or objects, pieces of world, but phenomena. These are not what 
interferes between us and things, preventing us to see them, to perceive 
in their givenness, but according to phenomenology they are the ways in 
which things themselves give to us and exhibit their own being.  
Subjects inhabit in the lifeworld. The researcher extracts his/her 
data from this world. So they are not fragments or samples of the world, 
but perceptions, intentional acts of the consciousness that gives meaning 
and organizes that world. But it is not a question of visions purely 
objective, individual constructions, psychic phenomena, mere singular 
representations. But intentioned objects, phenomena revealing the 
hidden profile of things. Husserl’s phenomenology is a description of the 
experience attentive at its invariant features and at the intersubjective 
value of perceptions.  
 
In a study that deals with education like mine, however, the two different 
versions are not in conflict since the subject, while not being initially trained to identify 
conceptual categories and units of meaning appropriate to the description of the 
subjective experience – excluded a brief initial task training that helps subjects to 
understand what they have to do – it is assumed they would be able to refine upon their 
descriptions as a natural result of the experiential practice undertaken. If this happens, 
how and when, is the object of study for my research.  
The method that I used is closer to the DES method because we where interested 
in catching the so-called pristine experience. Indeed the Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, & Heavey, 2001; 2004; 2006) is a research method 
developed to describe as faithfully as possible the ‘inner experience,’ by which the 
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authors mean that anything is going on in awareness at a particular moment (defined by 
a beep), whatever is ‘before the footlights of consciousness’ (as William James would 
say) at that moment. That is, DES seeks to describe whatever phenomena are directly 
occurring to a person at a precise moment. It is a method for the observation and 
description of inner experience as it happens at a specific moment and specific place. 
Briefly, DES subjects wear random beepers in their natural environments. The random 
beep cues the subject immediately to pay attention to the inner experience that was 
ongoing at ‘the moment of the beep’ – the last undisturbed moment before the beep 
interrupted their natural environment. The difference between the DES and the 
phenomenological method we used is that we didn’t ask participants to describe random 
moment marked by a beep, but rather to describe the pristine perception of a specific 
weekly experience, the meditative experience. 
The phenomenological method aims at observing natural occurrences, 
experienced phenomena in their pristine state, unspoiled by the act of observation or 
reflection. We use ‘pristine’ here in the same way that we would use it in saying that a 
forest is pristine: unspoiled by civilization (Hurlburt, & Heavy, 2006).  
We recognize that a pristine forest contains things that are clean 
and dirty, simple and complex, healthy and rotting; however, it does not 
have the clear- cut stumps and plastic bottles that are the signs of human 
exploitation, and it does not have the park-service maps and visitor 
centers that tell you how to see and therefore interfere with the seeing of 
what’s already there. Likewise, pristine experiences can be simple or 
complex, clear or messy; we use ‘pristine’ to refer to experiences in their 
natural state, not disturbed by the act of observation, unplanned, 
unmapped, un-‘figured out’ already, uninterpreted, unheuristicized real 
experience. (Hurlburt, & Heavy, 2006, p. 89) 
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Accordingly, DES aims at observing pristine experience, actual phenomena that 
are actually being experienced by actual people at actual moments during actual natural 
activities, free of any artificial interference by the investigator. Of course it is 
impossible to completely avoid the role of the researcher but in this case the aim is to 
reduce it, keeping the subjective experience as whole as possible in its ecological 
dimension (Mortari, 2002). 
Pristine experiences are fundamental data of consciousness studies: pristine 
experience is the way real people experience real things in their real lives. I as a person 
am who I am in large part because of the things I experience and the way I experience 
them. As Hurlburt and Heavy (2006) specify, in any given moment of any real person’s 
existence, there is a welter of potential experience, some external (a myriad of 
surrounding objects and people, features of the environment such as temperature, wind, 
brightness, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.), some interoceptive, proprioceptive, kinesthetic 
events (pressures, pains, hunger pangs, limb/joint positions, tickles, itches, etc.), some 
innerly created events (thoughts, images, feelings, etc.). At every moment, a person 
selects/creates some very small number (often just one) of those potential experiences to 
form that moment’s actual pristine experience. Different people do that in different 
ways: one consistently creates visual images that are quite unrelated to the immediate 
environment; another, exactly in the same environment, consistently attends to 
emotional experience; a third, also in the same environment, consistently pays attention 
to the sensory features of that external environment. The way in which different people 
– but grouped in two samples – live the same meditative experience is what we 
investigated with the phenomenological method. Thus, as we will see, inner experience 
include thoughts, feelings, tickles, sensations, inner or external seeings, inner or 
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external hearings, kinesthetic awarenesses, tastes, and so on, anything that is explicitly a 
part of the ongoing awareness.  
Some scientists have preferred the terms ‘consciousness,’ ‘conscious 
experience,’ ‘experience,’ ‘subjective experience,’ or ‘in awareness’ to the term ‘inner 
experience,’ because ‘inner experience’ seems to favor ‘inner’ experiences such as 
thoughts and feelings over ‘outer’ experiences such as visual perception and sensation.  
I do not explicitly favor the ‘inner’ over the ‘outer’ in this way – I am interested in 
whatever phenomena are occurring, whether inner or outer. I believe that there is no 
best term; all have their advantages and drawbacks. Suffice it to say that by ‘inner 
experience’ DES means anything (inner or outer) that emerges into a person’s 
awareness, or coalesces, or becomes a phenomenon, or is experienced, out of the welter 
of inner and outer stimuli that simultaneously impinges on a person. As Hurlburt and 
Schwitzgebel (in press) discussed, the authors modify ‘experience’ with the term ‘inner’ 
because the unmodified ‘experience’ is too broad —they don’t wish to consider things 
like work experience or the moviegoing experience unless they happen to manifest 
themselves as explicit phenomena that occur within a person’s awareness directly at a 
specific moment. I will not discuss further the question of the terms. For a deeper 
analysis about that, see Overgaard and colleagues (2008). Based on that article, and 
remaining into the phenomenological tradition, I will use here the terms consciousness, 
lived experience, subjective phenomena. 
Wanting to investigate the conscious experience of subjects, I choose the 
phenomenological method because it is undoubtedly the right method for qualitative 
investigations about conscious experiences. The phenomenological method rules out 
anything that is outside of ongoing awareness. Thus it rules out ‘unconscious’ processes 
of any kind. It rules out physiological events (neuron firings, peristalsis, homeostatic 
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adjustments, and the like) unless they are specifically part of awareness. It rules out 
explanations and interpretations unless they are specifically part of awareness. It rules 
out events that have occurred before or after the actual moment of the question, the 
moment of the request to describe the personal experience. 
The phenomenological method is thus a fundamentally idiographic procedure: it 
produces a characterization of one particular person’s experiences. It is essentially 
irrelevant whether that person’s experiences are similar to or different from some or 
most other people’s experiences; the primary object is to characterize faithfully an 
individual person’s experiences. However, in some phenomenological as well as some 
DES studies, a collection of subjects who have some features (psychiatric diagnosis, for 
example) in common are investigated. In those studies, the investigator produces an 
idiographic characterization of each subject as described above and then examines all 
those characteristics to discover whatever salient characteristics might emerge across 
the collection of subjects. This allows the investigator to produce an across-subject or 
nomothetic characterization of the collection’s in-common salient inner experiences. 
Thus we used the phenomenological investigation as an idiographic procedure in 
one of two basic ways: as a purely idiographic procedure to encounter/describe the 
experienced phenomena of one individual; and as a series of idiographic procedures as 
steps in the direction of a nomothetic goal. 
The salient features that emerge from both phenomenological and DES studies 
(both within-subject/idiographic and across-subject/nomothetic) are often features of the 
form or pattern of how experience occurs within individuals. For example, salient form 
characteristics frequently involve inner speech, visual images, unsymbolized 
(unworded, unimaged) thinking, sensory awareness, or feelings. Content features or the 
pattern of what is being experienced can also emerge as salient characteristics. 
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A valid and interesting explanation of how the phenomenological methods differ 
from the conventional experimental method has been done by the Italian 
phenomenologist Paolo Bozzi, and here below I have reported the scheme as Michael 
Kubovy suggested when he wrote the Gestalt Psychology’s voice for the MIT’s 
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (2001). 
 
 
CONVENTIONAL 
METHOD 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
METHOD 
SETTING 
Isolated and controlled Every setting 
PARTICIPANTS 
naive Every kind 
TASK 
Defined Negotiated and shared 
ANSWER 
First and spontaneous; 
unchangeable; correct or 
incorrect; unambiguous; 
classificated a priori 
dense and rich of 
information; changeable; 
always good; classificated 
a posteriori 
Figure 7 Bozzi’s differences between conventional and phenomenological research 
methods, in Kubovy (2001). 
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The qualitative research methods suffer of a lack of generalizability of the 
results and because of that they are not believed to be useful in cognitive sciences.  
“It is totally mainstream in psychology or in cognitive science to 
have experiments where you ask people, Did you see this? Did you see 
that? Were you aware of this? This is the classical technical verbal 
report, which is used widely. …However … it doesn’t do justice to the 
richness and complexity of what is experienced. The verbal report 
requires somebody there who says, ‘Yeah, I saw it’, so there is some kind 
of access to experience. But it remains extremely impressionistic. [It] 
needs to be developed further. …One key thing: disciplined regular 
training. Without really specific regular training, like everything else in 
human affairs, you stay a beginner.” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 18) 
 
This is a feature of the phenomenological method: the subject, through the 
attention paid with  her own experience, learns to be more aware, she learns to perceive 
and describe the experience, so being able to better reach the pristine personal 
experience. We must distinguish between our ability to index our experiences and our 
ability to indefinitely finesse such descriptions (Francesconi & Gallagher, 2009; 
Gallagher & Francesconi, in press). 
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3.2	   A	   qualitative	   study	   on	   self	   consciousness:	   changes	   in	   first-­‐person	  
perspective	   following	  meditative	  practices	   in	  beginning	  and	  expert	  
adult	  subjects	  	  
3.2.1	  Method	  
Pilot study 
A pilot study has been conducted to test 1) the request to submit to the 
participants and 2) the duration in minutes of the moment dedicated to write the verbal 
report after the meditation session. This pilot study, conducted on 7 volunteers, revealed 
that the best solution for our goals was to use a very restricted question, focused on the 
actual experience, and to allow a short range of time to the participants for the 
experience description; these strategies were implemented to move the subjects’ 
attention toward the pristine experience avoiding the hermeneutic attitude; obviously 
the interpretation of an experience is always present when asked to describe it, but our 
interest, as I had already specified earlier, was to reduce the interpretative dimension of 
the self reports, promoting the descriptive one. Thus, after the pilot trials, we decide to 
avoid a too broad question and too long time available for the self report. 
 
 Method 
The two different phenomenological methods I used are the following: a) the 
snapshot written report, b) the open-ended interview. 
a) The snapshot method is something quite unusual within qualitative methods in 
the educational sciences. We adopted this method from DES (Hurlburt, & Heavy 
2001; 2004; 2006) IPA (Smith, et al., 2009) and the neuro-phenomenological 
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method (Lutz, et al, 2002). Some characteristics are: 1) to reduce the temporal 
distance between the experience and the description of the experience; 2) to 
encourage the immediate and pristine description, minimizing retrospection; 3) 
to reduce the narrative/metacognitive attitude of the subjects (presentation vs. 
re-presentation, Thompson, 2007, p. 24); 4) successive approximation to 
faithful reporting; 5) bracketing presuppositions; 6) non-leading attitude of the 
researcher; 7) bottom-up theorizing. 
b) With regards to the final open-ended interview, we took in consideration the 
method suggested by Petitmengin (2006; 2010), which consists of an interview 
process that has to help the subject to refine its own descriptions and answers 
through a training process – in the form of interaction – conducted by the 
researcher. The role of the researcher in this case, but only in this case, is more 
important than in the first phase of the research.  
 
Participants 
The groups were composed of 22 participants, 10 experts and 12 beginners. 
Identification data had been collected prior to the study, such as age, qualifications, 
current and past occupations, customary meditation practices and sport practices in 
general, and the reasons for participating in the course. 
Here below is the table about the demographic data collected from participants.   
 Beginners Experts 
Number 12 10 
Age M 36; range 23-49 M 48; range 33-65 
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Sex 8 females 6 females 
Meditative experience Less than 2 months More than 9 years 
Ethnicity 
8 Americans; 3 Afro-
american; 1 Latin 
9 Americans; 1 Afro-
american 
Religion 
4 Christians; 5 Atheists; 2 
Buddhists; 1 Hindu 
4 Christians; 4 Buddhists; 
2 Atheists 
 
Following other suggestions (Lazard, et al., 2005; Lutz, et al., 2008;) we 
considered experts subjects with more than 9 years of practice and beginners with less 
than 2 months of practice. Only healthy adults were selected; a pre-screening interview 
had been administered to evaluate physical and mental conditions of the subjects. Four 
people were excluded from the study due to their medical conditions or physical 
experience. 
Subjects were recruited in the field, that is in meditation schools; an 
advertisement had been used to recruit them. Meditators had also been randomly 
recruited amongst the students at Harvard and flyers had been distributed by hand and 
hung on the boards. In both cases, experts and beginners, a snowball sampling 
procedure had been used asking individuals to spread the information to people who 
could be interested in participating. Participants received a monetary compensation at 
the end of the research, right after the open-question interview. Compensation was pro-
rated when participants withdrew early. Some meditation schools were contacted in the 
Boston area to ask for permission to spread the flyers to their students. 
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The subjects signed the written IRB-Harvard ethical consent form and they 
received a copy for their records. 
During this preliminary meeting all the information required by the Ethical 
Committee and needed by the subjects was communicated; few and simple instructions 
were provided as well as a short pre-task training session: following Depraz (2006; 
Depraz, et al., 2003), Lutz and colleagues (2002) and Petitmengin (2006) this training 
experience was done to make the subjects familiar with the required weekly task. 
 
 Material 
Voice recorder, notebooks, and field materials. A notebook for writing self 
reports was provided to all subjects during the first meeting. Subjects’ notebooks were 
identified with key codes as well as subjects’ identities and final open ended interviews. 
 
 Task and procedure 
The study was 8 weeks long. A pre-post questionnaire (attached) was assessed at 
the beginning and at the end of the study. The data from the questionnaire are not 
presented in this thesis. During the study, right after the completion of a meditation 
session (both in the meditation class or at home, according to participants' preferrance), 
participants described in a notebook (for not more than 5 minutes) the experience that 
they had been through; this written self-report occurred weekly mostly on the same day; 
to assure constant participation, a weekly-reminder in the form of an email was sent to 
each participant on the same day every week. The notebooks of the meditators were 
collected at the end of the period. Participants were asked to write down their 
description following this request: “Please describe as closely as possible the experience 
you have been through just now as you lived it”. ‘Such an open question allows subjects 
  87 
to produce more complex responses and to describe the experience in its own terms’ 
(Overgaard, et al., 2008).  
An open-questions interview was conducted with every single participant at the 
end of the study. The survey and interview were the only procedures conducted for 
research purposes and the meditation sessions took place regardless of whether or not 
the study was conducted. 
A short pre-screening phone survey was used to assess an individual's 
meditation experience and determine if they had any medical conditions that may 
exclude them from study participation. They were asked: if they had any experience in 
meditation, if so how long this experience was, which kind of meditation it was; if they 
had or have any specific and serious medical condition and what it is. Medical 
conditions which could exclude individuals from participation were: ADHD, alcohol or 
drug addiction, bulimia, anorexia, epilepsy, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, post-
traumatic disorder, serious physical injuries or disabilities. Subjects who were not 
qualified to take part in the study were excluded. 
As mentioned, a weekly reminder in the form of an automatic email to every 
participant was set; this was done in order  to avoid oversights in the weekly self-report 
task, and to remind the subjects the exact task that had to be done. 
  
Research question 
The research questions were voted to investigate the differences between expert 
and beginning meditators with regard to the subjective experience, in particular self 
perception and description during and after a course of meditation with repeated 
sessions (8 times, one per week, for two months). The narrative and descriptive 
categories used by subjects – beginners and experts – in the description/interpretation of 
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their own experience were observed. Differences and commonalities were extrapolated, 
defining the development of the first-person perspective through the accuracy of the 
verbal description used by the subjects.  
 
Method of Data Collection 
The method of data collection is the phenomenological method (Mortari, & 
Tarozzi 2010; Moustakas, 1994); most of the snapshot reports were collected at the end 
of the 8 week period, during the final interview, withdrawing the notebooks. Few 
subjects sent the snapshot report weekly via email. The final interviews were collected 
during the last meeting which lasted 40 to 60 minutes; during this meeting the 
compensation was also provided. 
 
Method for the data analysis 
Seven steps were followed for the data analysis (Giorgi, 2009; Mortari, & 
Tarozzi, 2010; Moustakas, 1994): 
a) First reading to get the whole sense of the texts; 
b) Marking meaning/descriptive units; 
c) Collecting meaning and descriptive units in categories; 
d) Abstracting categories in Phenomenological clusters; 
e) Memo and research diary to trace the decisions taken by the researchers; 
f) Intersubjective data analysis done by two different researchers who at the end of 
the data analysis compared the categories creating shared categories; two 
supervisors checked all the data analysis process; 
g) Software based data analysis (NVivo8). 
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Units were identified through their ‘density’ and ‘relevance’ based on the 
researchers’ perspective (Mortari, & Sità, 2010; Mortari, & Tarozzi, 2010; Tarozzi, 
1997); no quantitative analysis were conducted on the data. 
The written report of subjects and semi-structured interviews were transcribed 
into electronic format and analyzed with the aid of the computer software NVivo8; the 
transcription of audio materials was verbatim; the analysis of such transcribed material 
was encoded by categories of concepts and units of meaning and grouped by identifying 
similarities in phenomenological clusters (Giorgi, 2009; Lutz 2002; 2008; Lutz et al. 
2002; Moustakas 1994); the coding was performed jointly by two researchers to reduce 
the biases, to mediate the influence of one individual and refine the labels that were 
assigned to units of meaning (Mortari, 2007; Moustakas, 1994). The definition of the 
labels and categories was further supervised by the Italian advisor, Professor 
Massimiliano Tarozzi, and by the American tutor at Harvard University, Professor Kurt 
Fischer. The emerging data were constantly compared and revised according to the 
evolutionary and recursive logic of phenomenological approach (Tarozzi, & Mortari, 
2010); 
According to the traditional modalities of qualitative and phenomenological 
research (Kvale, 1996; Mortari, 2007; Tarozzi, 2008), research’s diary and memoing 
were used to trace the path that the researchers performed during the research process.  
Here below you can see how the analysis was conducted from the text to the 
phenomenological clusters through meaning/descriptive units and categories. 
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Figure 8 Structure of the text analysis, from the text to the phenomenological cluster. 
Depending on the complextity of the cluster, there are more or less intermediate steps 
 
 
Text	  
Meaning/descriptive	  units	  
Categories	  
Phenomenological	  cluster	   Phenomenological	  cluster	  	  
Category	  
Meaning/descritive	  unit	  
xyz	  
Meaning/descriptive	  unit	  
abc	  
Category	  
Meaning/descriptive	  unit	  
lmn	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3.2.2	  Results	  
 BEGINNERS EXPERTS 
SELF REPORTS 96 80 
OPEN ENDED 
INTERVIEWS 
12 10 
TIME OF 
MEDITATION 
Afternoon/evening Morning and evening 
DURATION OF 
MEDITATION SESSION 
5/10 mins 30/40 mins 
HOW MANY TIME PER 
DAY 
1 2 
HOW MANY DAYS PER 
WEEK 
2/3 6/7 
WHERE Meditation school/home Meditation 
school/work/home/nature 
STYLE OF 
MEDITATION 
Mindfulness/Trascendental 
(basic level) 
Mindfulness/Trascendental/ 
Vipassana/Buddhism/Zen 
(high level including yoga, 
tai chi) 
FOCUS OF 
MEDITATION 
Breath (rarely words or 
sentences) 
Breath (sometimes ritual 
words, sentences or 
images) 
Figure 9 Total of self reports and interviews, and data about the meditation practice 
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Figure 10 Phenomenological clusters and their categories 
Clusters	  and	  Categories	  
Overall	  Awareness	  • Awakening	  • Effects	  lasting	  • Well	  being	   Descriptive	  language	  • Precision	  of	  the	  language	  • Type	  of	  language	  
Meditative	  technique	  • Internal	  and	  external	  attractors	  • Internal	  and	  external	  distractors	  • Self	  learning	  /self	  evaluation	  
Dif`iculties	  and	  fatigue	  • Find	  and	  mantain	  the	  position	  and	  posture	  • Find	  and	  mantain	  the	  mental	  focus	  • Sore	  or	  pain	  
Embodied	  cognition	  • Emotion	  recognition	  • Body	  scan	  • Body	  mereology	  
Being	  in	  the	  space	  • Spatial	  perception	  • Action	  execution	  and	  control	  
Meaning	  attribution	  • General	  sense	  of	  meditative	  experience	  • Pedagogical	  sense	  of	  meditative	  experience	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Different types of conceptual categories and units of meaning have been 
identified by researchers; among them, as we can see more in detail below, there are 
categories that are purely descriptive, emotional, cognitive, physical, relating to psycho-
physical well-being or enhanced sense of empathy and prosociality, the ability to 
discriminate between physical states (posture, respiratory rhythm, heart rhythm, 
physical sensations) and mental states (inner speech, mental distractors, emotions).  
Below are indicated the clusters with their categories. Within the categories the 
meaning/descriptive units are reported separately for beginners and experts, and then 
some significant sentences or parts of the texts are reported as examples. 
 
 
Overall awareness 
Categories 
Beginners’ descriptive 
units 
Experts’ descriptive units 
Awakening 
First deep breath; 
rediscovery 
- 
Effects lasting Very short (5 mins or less) Continuous 
Well-being 
Lightness; happiness; self-
world harmony 
Recharge; flow of 
experience; self-world 
harmony 
 
  94 
 
 
Awakening 
This is a category that emerged immediately after the first reading of the self-
reports, especially the beginners’ ones. Indeed, when they start the meditation session, 
the first impression they often have is to re-discover some physical sensations that are 
not usually under the light of the mind, and this ‘awakening’ is very surprising and 
powerful for them. 
I find it difficult to relax my body, and become very conscious of 
tension in my shoulder (especially the right side) and shoulderblades. I 
had not noticed this during the day but now that I’m noticing it looks like 
I discover my body again… I have my body back! 1B1 
 
 
 
Effects lasting 
This category assembles the descriptive units that indicate that some effects of 
meditation, as the general well-being, last till after the meditation session itself, for a 
few minutes. We decided to explore this category further with the open-ended interview 
after we found few descriptive units in the self reports. Thanks to that we discovered 
that beginner subjects frequently reported that these effects didn’t last for more than 
approximately 5 minutes. Experts say that thanks to two or three sessions per day they 
don’t usually perceive a break in the effects of meditation; for them it is as if the effects 
of mediation last all day long. 
Here there is an interesting example of a bit longer endurance of the effects after 
a meditation session. A beginner reports the follow: 
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One particular morning I transitioned quite well and once again 
used the birds chirping and my breathing to focus. I felt so much lighter 
and upon entering the shower, for the first time I was present. I thought 
of nothing else but the water and the suds and the feeling of the 
washcloth on my skin. Nothing mind blowing happening, but brilliant! 
Of course at some point on the way to work I lost it, but the 
experience was eye opening for me. You really can meditate on the 
actions that you are doing. I found that I was a lot more pleasant that 
day as well. 2B6 
 
 
 
Well-being 
This category is probably one of the most common among the categories we 
found and also one of the most common in the literature. Meditation, especially for 
beginners, seems to have a sort of immediate effect on the psychophysical well-being.  
The example: 
I focused on my breathing, as instructed, and the thing that 
astounds me is how rapidly those physical discomforts go away. One 
moment, they are all you can think about, and all of a sudden, it is just a 
simple matter of breathing in, breathing out... and the peace of mind and 
the body that follows immediately is really something. 10B4 
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Descriptive language 
 
Categories Beginners Experts 
Precision of language 
Vague; narrative; 
mentioning daily issues; 
meditation as a break or 
restore after the hard day 
Descriptive; energy 
recharge 
Kind of language Idealistic/mystical 
Concrete; pragmatic; 
grounded 
Spaciousness of mind Mind is wide, surprise Mind is wide 
 
 
As we said in the theoretical part of this thesis, there is a gap between the 
experience and the description of the experience. The gap is a linguistic gap. Indeed it is 
not easy to describe an experience for the first time, especially a profound experience as 
meditation. However, as the phenomenologists point out (Depraz, et al., 2003; 
Gallagher, & Zahavi, 2008; Tarozzi, & Mortari 2010; Varela, 1996; Varela et al. 1991), 
the consciousness even in its linguistic dimension is something that can be learnt. This 
is the difference between experts and beginners. Mindfulness meditation training always 
includes a verbal debriefing after the meditation session, where participants are asked to 
describe the mental and physical states during the experience; this procedure, that is 
exactly what we did in our study, helps subjects to recognize and describe in a better 
way what happens during the session. We saw in our data that experts are much better 
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than beginners at these descriptions and below we reported the two categories that 
represent this difference.  
 
 
 
Precision of descriptive language 
The precision of descriptive language shows how different subjects are able to 
capture the details of the meditative experience or how they are vague in doing that. The 
categories we found especially within the beginner group reveal that they have 
difficulties in focussing on the actual meditative experience. Please consider that every 
time they wrote a self report, just after the meditation session, they had to write in the 
notebook where the research question was clearly indicated as follow: “Please describe 
as closely as possible the experience you have been through just now as you lived it”. 
This request is clearly asking about the experience lived just a moment before but we 
found that beginners usually spoke in a narrative modality, describing the daily issues. 
Experts, given their training, are much more able to stay tuned on the actual meditative 
experience describing what happened in a descriptive modality instead of in a narrative 
one. 
Moreover beginners seem to consider the moment they reserve to meditation as 
a break or restore from daily issues and problems, as the meditation session was, finally, 
a moment to get away from ‘real’ life or from personal issues; experts, on the other 
hand, considered the moment dedicated to meditation as a moment to ‘recharge their 
energy’ but without considering it as an escape from reality. That is why experts are 
more in a ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’ mode with regard to meditative 
experience; this one, indeed, seems to be already included in their lives without a big 
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gap between  normal life and the meditation sessions. For beginners it is exactly the 
contrary; they consider meditation as something far from ordinary life, something that is 
separate from their embodied habits.  
Here there are two different self reports and they are very good examples of the 
precision of the language and the details reported by beginners and experts: 
Beginner:  
‘The main role my body had in this experience was to feel the 
physical changes that occurred during meditation.  I could feel the 
release of tension in my muscles and the expansion of space within my 
body.  It was also important for me to feel the energy in and around my 
body.  It makes it very clear just how connected the body, mind, and 
spirit really are.’ 
 
Expert:  
‘Sitting. Noticing a certain waking up as soon as I sit.  Noticing 
breath, feeling body, mind slowing down.  Settling into seated posture. 
erect, tall, not stiff, relaxing into my cushion. Feeling the cushion on the 
backs of my thighs, feet on the floor, feeling the soles of my feet against 
the carpet.  Breath in, soft belly to let breath in.  Breathe out.  Deep 
sighing exhale happens on its own.  Simple.  Not Easy.’  
 
This category is very indicative of the difference between beginner and expert 
meditators. Indeed it results that beginners more often describe reflexive thoughts 
compared to experts. Given that the task required to be focused on the actual meditative 
experience, beginner subjects show a poor ability to stay tuned on the actual experience, 
to stay focused on only that. It seems that less training of the ‘consciousness’ leaves 
more space for the mind to wander around; in this case we can say that a less 
‘phenomenological mind’ means a more ‘hermeneutical self’, more narrative and 
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autobiographical prospective. Here there is an example of narrative language by an 
expert who recognizes that he is not focused as required: 
 However, while breathing, thoughts kept straying to how I've 
been largely neglecting my commitment to this study (I think I'm at 
slightly less than once a week now. I'll step up soon!), and my job. I 
haven't been making the kind of progress I like on my work project, and 
in some ways, I hope that meditation can clear my mind enough to make 
room for new perspectives and interesting insights. Instead, I just find 
myself not focusing on breathing and trying to turn new angles around in 
my head. It was harder this evening to silence the general chatter in my 
mind than usual. 1B4 
 
 
 
 
Kind of language 
From the self reports we noted that beginners tend to speak about mystical, 
spiritual or supernatural events or sensations; this phenomenon could be related to some 
physical sensation that they are not able to recognize precisely and describe faithfully. 
This category is not common in the literature; we reported below an example which 
explains how a subject perceives something in her hands, something like a light, that is 
probably related to the fact that during meditation the hands can get warmer.  
 
I don’t know if it is normal, I think so, I had an impressing 
experience during this session. I felt something like a light coming out of 
my hands, my palms and fingers. It’s not the first time I feel this strange 
sensation. 8B6 
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It was also important for me to feel the energy in and around my 
body.  It makes it very clear just how connected the body, mind, and 
spirit really are. 2B5 
 
 
 
 
Spaciousness of mind 
This is a category that emerged from the data and that has been suggested to me 
by Varela and colleagues (1991). Indeed Varela and colleagues, even without any 
specific data to support it, indicated that this metaphor is something that explains well 
what a subject feels during the meditation. In their own words “Meditators also report 
experiencing space and spaciousness of mind. A traditional metaphor for this 
experience is that mind is the sky (a non conceptual background) in which different 
mental contents, like clouds, arise and subside. Experience of panoramic awareness and 
of space are natural outgrowths of mindfulness/awareness meditation” (p. 44). 
 
Participants of my study use this metaphor few times and a paradigmatic case is 
this one (an expert and a beginner): 
I felt a space open up in my mind, a vertical and huge space. 
Inside the space was calm and peace. 2E2 
 
There was also feelings of calm, tranquility, and openness in my 
mind. At times there were momentary feelings of expansion, of sinking, of 
clarity. 4B1 
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Meditation technique 
Categories Beginners Experts 
Internal and external 
attractors 
First and deep breath; 
words 
Breath rhythm; words/ 
sentences; mental images 
Internal and external 
distractors 
Body/posture; heart 
rhythm; breathe; thoughts; 
sounds/noise 
Physical tiredness; 
problems with digestion 
Self learning/self 
evaluation 
Strategies before or after 
meditation; improvement 
along the time 
- 
 
 
Attractors: 
The main descriptive unit for beginners within this category is definitely the 
‘first breath’; this is something that hadn't appeared in the literature yet but it is quite 
clear that beginners report the fact that to be and to stay focused on the breath the best 
‘attractor’ – that is something that helps to meditate, that makes it easier – is the initial 
first and breath at the beginning of the meditation session. They also report that when 
they lose focus the best way to go back to concentration again is to take a big and deep 
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breath. For experts the attractor is not a single breath but instead it is the breathing 
rhythm which has to be harmonic, continuous and effortless. A beginner reports: 
  
Upon sitting, I decided to not use the candles as I had last time. I 
focused on my breath though as I usually do, but jumped right into the 
deeper ones. I usually start with shallow ones in order to ease my way 
into my quiet time, but as things have been so crazy around the house I 
knew that deeper ones might be more effective. It's almost as if for a brief 
second, you can feel everything just slow down in each breath. It is 
inevitable; no escaping it. As tense as I have been, the minute I'd 
breathe, it was enough for me to calm down a bit and just sit. Just stop. 
2B5 
 
A beginner on the breath as an attractor: 
The basic practice of returning to the breath was helpful as a 
focus. It helped me to anchor in the present moment and to give me a 
steady centering tool   Often I would get pulled off, but the reminder to 
come back to the breath was relaxing in and of itself.  7B5 
 
 
An example of attractor for experts is the pray or words or ritual sentences as 
follow: 
When I began the formal sit, I started with Metta phrases about 
the other meditators in the room.  I said things like "May all the people 
in this room be completely at peace, be completely at ease, be still...” I 
kept repeating the phrases for a few minutes.  The voice was soft and a 
little distant, fading more and more in the background.  Then I focused 
on myself and said a few compassionate phrases to myself--reflecting on 
how hard it is to be a human being, how hard it is to have a conditioned 
mind like I do--full of fear, lust, and confusion.  I offered myself 
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forgiveness, patience, and kindness.  My concentration was very strong, 
centered, one-pointed.  The words came easily. 2E3 
 
Interestingly, an attractor which is believed to be a distractor for other subjects, 
for a beginner become important to help stay grounded on the meditative experience: 
I’m talking about auditory stimuli as, in this case, the birds chirping: 
I used the sounds of the birds chirping to help ground myself. 
They’re far enough in the distance to not be a nuisance but close enough 
for me to focus on that sound. I integrated my breath with the chirping 
and felt A LOT lighter. Though I was in my room, it felt just as if I was in 
a vast meadow. 11B5 
 
 
 
Internal and external distractors 
About the distractor: some studies speak about the ‘non-reactivity’ category for 
describing the ability of experts to not get distracted by external or internal stimuli 
(Dobkin, 2008; Kerr, not published; Mason, & Hargreaves, 2001). I agree that this 
category catches the sense of some descriptive units but we preferred to use the 
category ‘distractors’ because it is the closest one to the subjects’ reports. As you can 
see in the table there are some different distractors but one that probably was not 
considered enough before is the posture and the micro-movements that have to be done 
because it is very difficult, for beginners, to find the right position for meditating. Then 
noise and sounds in the environment are distracting also; for 2 beginners also the fact to 
perceive their heart rhythm and breathe rhythm was annoying.  
Here there is an example of a beginner who spoke about the improvement she 
had after the meditation course about the control on distractors: 
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I seem to have less reactive fear about the sensations.  Before I 
might think a certain sensation was something dangerous, and now I can 
more easily watch it arise and pass away and know that most sensations 
are impermanent.  Those that stay (like a leg injury) then would need 
more attention.  It helped me sort out which were serious and which 
were passing. 6B8 
 
 
 
Self learning/self evaluation 
In some cases, especially within the beginners’ group, subjects report to learn 
some strategies, tricks or methods to improve the quality of their meditative experience 
or to gain the self evaluation skill to evaluate what is right and wrong in the meditative 
session. They usually report on learning how to do meditation better as, for example, 
doing yoga or tai chi before or after the meditation sessions. Here there is a clear 
example: 
So in order to do that, I think for the next week I will stretch first. 
I think this process has really driven home to me why the movements in 
yoga is so connected with meditation. It definitely eases the process in 
trying to focus and bringing yourself to a much more receptive state. 
I have been averaging out to a half hour for meditating and I 
think that bracket is good for me for now. Once I start stretching first, 
though, I think I may be able to do even longer. 3B5 
 
Here there are two examples of a sort of self-evaluation about the improvements 
made (or not) by beginners: 
This week was especially fulfilling in meditation. It has become A 
LOT easier for me to focus. I'm not sure if it's practice or with all that's 
happened I have just finally learned to release control. (...) I have made 
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stretching a bit before meditating a routine and now that I have been 
able to "jump in" a bit faster, I have not needed as much time as before. 
2B6 
 
I don't think I've quite hit that level of meditative ability to have 
any success outside of quiet, personal environments. It is a pity! 9B7 
 
 
 
Difficulties and fatigue 
Categories Beginners Experts 
Find and keep posture 
Various micro-movement 
and postural adjustments 
- 
Find and keep mental 
focus 
Mental images; inner 
speech; fake presence 
- 
Sore or pain 
Difficulty to maintain the 
posture; back and legs 
aching 
Physical tiredness 
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Find and maintain the position and posture 
Also this category occurs more often within the beginners group and refers to 
the bodily dimension of the meditative session. The problem to find the right position, 
or to maintain the same position during the meditative session is quite an important 
problem and the subjects explicitly report that. To fail in finding the right and 
comfortable position prevents finding the right mental focus on the task as well.  
An example of the problems that beginners have to face is reported below; they 
are very often related to the back or to the position of the legs: 
At first, choose to sit cross-legged on a soft surface, but find it 
too hard to settle into, and use the hardwood floor instead. I have to find 
the most comfortable position otherwise I can’t even start to meditate 
1B6 
 
 
 
 
Find and maintain the mental focus 
Here you can see some examples of the difficulty to keep the concentration on 
the task, that is the breath. We have to consider that a task of this type – focus on the 
breath – is totally normal for people who do meditation often but it is not usual within 
our Western culture. Beginners who have to face that for the first time find some 
problems that I have summarized below: 
This week was EXTREMELY difficult for me to focus. I could 
barely find time to sit and think quietly and when I actually did, I had so 
much stress going on that letting my thoughts "float away" seemed 
impossible. 10B4 
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It was rough. I started with great intentions, but it took me 
about fifteen minutes to remember that I was supposed to be meditating. 
2B1 
 
I tried to stay focused, but that only turned into me being 
frustrated with not focusing. 12B2 
 
Prior to these sessions, I had meditated but I don't think I gave 
myself enough time to relinquish things that happened in my life. I was 
sitting and I did try my best to focus on my breath, but for someone like 
me who tends to hold on to the issues of the day, I do need to give myself 
the time I need to "give away" my issues to a higher power before even 
attempting to focus on meditating completely. And after realizing that 
this week, I think I appreciate it even more. 2B4 
 
The fake presence is when subjects think they are present but they are just 
thinking about being present. Here there is an example, which is a sentence that is ialso 
ncluded in another category: 
It was rough. I started with great intentions, but it took me 
about fifteen minutes to remember that I was supposed to be meditating. 
2B1 
 
 
 
Sore or pain 
This is another category which doesn’t appear in other studies, both quantitative 
and qualitative. From a didactical point of view it is important to consider what are the 
main problems that prevent to learn something; in this case we have to emphasize that 
subjects – again beginners – some times report problems deriving from sore or pain, 
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specially due to the physical position. It seems truly necessary to take into consideration 
a category like this one to improve the didactics of meditation and to help participants to 
use coping strategies. 
Here there is an example: 
Unlike the last time I tried this, I wasn't very conscious of too 
much tension in my body. (That's a good thing, I think!) However, I had 
trouble ignoring physical annoying phenomena -- my right ear itched, 
my neck itched, my legs… were asleep, and this all detracted from my 
ability to focus. (As a side note, post-session, I am now itchier than when 
I began.) 9B3 
 
Sometimes I don’t know if meditating makes my body relaxed or 
totally tired. I only know that the sitting position is really sore, and also 
keep the back straight is not easy at all. 7B2 
 
 
 
 
Embodied cognition 
Categories Beginners Experts 
Emotion recognition 
Disappointment or 
angriness because of daily 
issues; positive emotions 
- 
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Body scan 
Macro areas (head; back; 
abdomen; legs; inability to 
identify thoracic 
diaphragm) 
Micro areas (eyelids, lips 
and chin release, throat, 
back leg, the foot, right / 
left, reducing breathing 
rate) 
Body mereology Body as a whole Body as home; harmony 
 
 
 
Emotion recognition 
Despite categories related to the wide topic of emotions are often used for 
investigating meditative training, we have to say that this category – emotion 
recognition – emerged rarely and doesn’t seem to have an important role, at least in our 
data analysis process. For sure we can say that beginners have a general consideration 
of the emotion perception and description; indeed they speak about general and vague 
categories as happiness or sadness, which are often related to the daily issues as we 
have already seen in a previous category. With regard to experts we have to say that we 
didn’t find significant descriptive units for this category. 
 
 
Body scan 
In this category the difference between the expertise of beginners and experts 
emerges very clearly. In fact, experts report more often and in a more meaningful way 
how they perceive their bodies during meditation. Experts definitely have more precise 
and detailed body perceptions and beginners are usually more vague and generic. 
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It seems interesting to notice that the face and the muscles of the face are often 
recalled by experts, as the eyebrows, the lips or the chin. As you can see in the table 
beginners speak more about macro bodily area like the head, the chest, the legs and so 
on.  
Here we have an example by an expert: 
I could feel my face relaxing and whenever I lost it, my eyebrows 
would tighten and my head would feel different. I like that I am a lot 
more in tune with my body and how it feels when I am in a proper state 
of meditation. It is literally as if a weight has been lifted...specifically 
from my face. I would like to get that feeling from my whole body.  
 
To see another significant comparison, please see the example I reported for the 
‘precision of descriptive language’ category. There you can see how an expert describes 
much more precisely the body perception, speaking about micro bodily areas whereas 
the beginner is generally speaking about macro bodily areas. 
 
 
 
Body mereology  
Body mereology means that one feels as a whole, unique and harmonic being. 
This category appears to have the same relevance for experts and beginners, while the 
body scan is definitely better for experts. This could suggest that perceiving parts of the 
body is much more difficult than perceiving the body as a whole. 
 
When I meditate I always have the same feeling: I am my body. I 
mean, I feel like if my mind and my body are the same thing, like if my 
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body has no parts, I mean, it has different parts but they are tied 
together. This is a great feeling! 8B7 
 
 
 
 
Being in the space 
Categories Beginners Experts 
Spatial perception 
Peri-personal space; body 
volume 
Self-word harmony 
(smoothness); movement 
as a flow 
Action execution and 
control 
Grasping; walking; action 
smooth, fluid, calm and 
precise 
- 
 
This category is a good example to explain how few and rare but dense data 
emerged by the snapshots. This data was then deepened with the final semi-structured 
interview. Indeed I noticed that some subjects described in the self reports how the 
meditative experience was changing their subjective perception of the space and the 
‘phenomenological perspective on being in the space’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Then I 
decided to further investigate these clues by asking how and when subjects perceived a 
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change in the afterward experience and we found two main categories within the ‘being 
in the space’ cluster. 
 
 
 
Spatial perception and body volume 
For us this is another interesting category: beginners report to perceive some 
differences between the pre-meditation space perception and the post-meditation space 
perception. Investigating these claims more through the semi-structured interviews we 
found that subjects describe changes in the peri-personal space – the space all around 
the body that can be reached extending the limbs – and body volume; for example, 
some of them reported that their chest appeared bigger than before the meditation 
session; some others spoke about the entire body as bigger than before, and so on. 
About the volume of the body a beginners said: 
The main role my body had in this experience was to feel the 
physical changes that occurred during meditation.  I could feel the 
release of tension in my muscles and the expansion of space within my 
body. 2B7 
 
Another one: 
The body became relaxed. At times it buzzed, tingled, felt like it 
was expanding like a balloon, and then shrinking. The hips opened up. 
10B4 
 
 
 
Action execution and control 
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Also this category has been deepened more through the final interviews. Few 
subjects, in the self reports, said that they perceived their actions much more smoothly 
and precise after meditation. For experts it seems to be the same, in the opposite 
manner; if they didn't meditate once for any reason they felt less smooth and harmonic 
in their movements. Also this category doesn’t appear in any study within the dedicated 
literature, both in qualitative and quantitative literature. 
The body plays a huge role.  At first, during the initial deep 
breath and few minutes, awareness of tension in the body is 
pronounced.  After watching the breath for 5-10 minutes, my body was 
more relaxed and seemed to stay that way for several hours afterwards. 
Probably less. However I clearly perceive myself moving smoothly after 
each meditation session. 11B5 
 
 
 
 
Meaning attribution 
Categories Beginners Experts 
General sense of 
meditative experience  
Self rediscovery; will to 
live; happiness; questions 
about life 
Psychophysical well being; 
recharge; personal hygiene 
  114 
Pedagogical sense of 
meditative experience 
Experience that change 
immediate consideration of 
the life; will to improve 
the life; will to continue 
the meditative practice 
Self development; spiritual 
growth 
 
 
 
General sense of meditative experience 
This category is one of the most notable in the self reports and in the interviews 
also. Beginners often describe the meditative experience has something that makes them 
happier because it helps them to look at the world in a different way. Also the self 
discovery, even though it could be obvious, is a very import category for beginners. 
Experts, instead, speak more of meditation as an energy recharger, or a personal daily 
hygiene. 
Here there is an example of ‘question about life’ category, emerged by a 
beginner’s self report. 
Reflecting on Jimmy's life & death led me to considering my own 
life and eventual death.  Am I living well?  Am I happy?  Is this how I 
want to be spending my precious time?  What else would I like to do with 
my remaining time as a human being? 
What is the nature of my relationship with all of the people in my 
life?  What will they remember about me?  What will be my 
continuation?  Which of my thoughts, words, and actions will people 
remember and find some value in? 
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What is the essence of Jimmy's life?  And of mine? 3B7 
 
Here there is another example of the general sense of the meditative experience 
related to the well-being for everyone. 
Meditation is a tool that is not used as frequently as it should be, 
but that would benefit a lot of people in many different areas of their 
lives.  If more people could release stress in their bodies and minds, I 
think their overall health would greatly improve! 2B8 
 
 
 
Pedagogical sense of meditative experience 
The effect of a meditation course on beginners seems to be very deep, at least 
soon after the course. They report that a course like this one moves them toward the will 
to improve their life, even repeating the meditative experience. What should be 
investigated is whether subjects truly go on doing meditation or not, given that people 
easily drop out from meditation courses and that meditative practice is not easy. 
Here there is an example for this category by an expert. 
I think that meditation is really something that can improve the 
human being. We are so far from the full development of our minds and 
brains. They should take meditation courses in the schools. 5E8 
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3.2.3	  Discussion	  
The main results that appear to be important for the discussion are as follows: 
a) Grounded in to the experience 
Experts seem to be more grounded in to the experience than beginners; indeed 
beginners use less descriptive language and more of a narrative one, describing not only 
the actual meditative experience but also some daily issues. The mystical language, 
then, is indicative for beginners: it probably means that some particular physical effects 
of meditation, as the warm hands after few minutes of meditation, cannot be properly 
recognized and linguistically expressed by beginners due to a lack of experience. Then, 
they tend to use an idealistic language while experts are more detailed about the 
experience, both bodily and mentally. 
b) First and deep breath vs. rhythmic breath 
There is a fundamental role of the first breath for the ‘awakening’, as reported by 
beginners. This is a point that has never revealed by other studies but the main attractor 
for beginners is the first and, specially, deep breath. For experts, instead, the rhythm 
appears to be more important.  
c) Body scan  
Body scan is a category that is relevant for both groups; however for experts it is much 
more detailed. The difference consists of the degree of precision in using the language 
to describe the bodily experience. Experts are more precise and detailed when speaking 
about bodily sensations or perception: they refer to what we call micro bodily areas 
whereas beginners refer to macro bodily areas. 
d) Body mereology  
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Body mereology is a category that is present in both groups, whereas, as we saw, the 
body scan is a more important category for experts. This fact allows to think that  
perceiving the body as a whole is easier than perceiving the single parts of it.  
e) Non-reactivity in expert vs. beginners 
This category is well recognized within the literature and it emerged in our study as 
well. Mindfulness meditation is a technique based on the fact that the subject can 
develop the ability to remain into the flow of consciousness without getting distracted 
by any kind of stimuli. However, though this is true for experts, it is not for beginners. 
Indeed they get easily distracted by internal stimuli (hearth rhythm, mental images, 
inner speech, fake presence and so on) and external stimuli (sounds, noise, itching and 
so on).  
f) Switch from the pre-reflective self-consciousness to the reflective self-
consciousness due to the proprioceptive experience 
From our data it seems that experts have a more embodied perception of meditative 
practice; that means that they don’t consider meditation as an escape from reality but it 
is a daily activity instead. For experts the proprioceptive experience is something that is 
completely embodied in daily life, but for beginners it is something that still has to be 
brought into their ordinary lives. This marks the difference between a well-developed 
pre-reflective self-consciousness and a reflective self-consciousness. 
g) Difficulties in learning the meditative technique;  
This category has to do with the didactical structure and program of a meditative course, 
and we can say that so far it has not been well considered yet within literature.  
Subjects, especially beginners, report some problems, difficulties, even sore, during or 
after the meditative session. Sore and pain can also easily distract subjects from the 
task. This is something that has to be taken more into consideration when we investigate 
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meditation; indeed the difficulties or problem related to meditation are not investigated 
as well as the good and healthy effects of it. With this research we want to stress this 
point more. 
h) The whole sense of meditation 
For both beginners and experts meditation has a deep ethical and pedagogical value in 
their personal development. We saw that meditation can help to arouse important 
questions about life, what we named pedagogical and ethical perspective, and it leads 
subjects to the will to improve their lifestyle. Meditation seems to induce subjects, both 
beginners and experts, to a high consideration of the importance of taking care of 
themselves; as Mortari says, to take care of ones self is an essential pedagogical value 
and it induces an attitude voted to an informal sort of continuing education, that is the 
intention to always improve and enrich the life (Mortari, 2002). Form this point of view 
meditation and education pursue the same goals. 
 
 
 
Limits of the study 
The problem of qualitative studies is the validation of the results (Petitmengin 
2006; Petitmengin, & Bitbol, 2009; Tarozzi, 1997; 2008); given that statistical methods 
are not used in qualitative research, usually the comparison with other similar studies is 
done as term for validation. 
Validation requires two steps:  
• Comparison with other similar researches (Kerr, not published; Dobkin, 2008; 
Mason,  & Hargreaves, 2001); 
• Stringency of the procedure (Tarozzi, 2008). 
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The literature about qualitative studies for investigating the FPP in meditation is 
not well developed yet, even though it seems indispensable to offer a qualitative data set 
about it, both for educational, psychological or medical aims. This study showed the 
difference and the similarities of descriptive and meaning units used by beginning and 
expert meditators. More qualitative studies are needed both to validate my research and 
to enlarge the qualitative data on meditation. A further qualitative research with the 
same design as the one I proposed here will be shortly conducted in Italy and it will be a 
first step for a comparison analysis. 
 
 
  
 
4.	  Conclusions	  
4.1	   The	  learning	  mind:	  meditation	  as	  education	  
The development of awareness is a fundamental pedagogical theme and it is the 
main goal of meditation as well: that is why we can speak of meditation as education. 
What we have to learn when we do mindfulness meditation is nothing else than being 
able to use our awareness to deepen our presence in the world. It is the embodied 
presence – embodied mind – which gets improved by meditation; it is a sort of 
cognitive posture that had to be educated, a new perspective on the world grounded in 
the lived experience (Mortari, 2002). 
In the preface to Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty stated that “The 
whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we 
want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of 
its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world 
of which science is a second-order expression” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 9). 
Phenomenology makes a distinction between two different attitudes, the natural 
and the phenomenological (Zahavi, 2005). In our everyday dealing with the world, we 
accept without questioning it that there is a reality that we and other people are part of, 
and that this reality exists independently of us. This tacit, realistic belief – without 
which our ordinary dealings with the world would be disrupted by an endless set of 
questions – is called the natural attitude. According to phenomenologists, science also 
subscribes to the natural attitude, because it too takes for granted the existence of a 
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world, which is thought to be independent of mind, experience, and theory (Gallagher, 
& Zahavi, 2008). 
Phenomenologists, on the other hand, should be “aroused by and immediately 
sensitive to the completely enigmatic character of what for sound common sense, is 
without question and self explanatory” (Heidegger, 1976, pp. 23-24, as quoted by 
Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 22). The phenomenological attitude involves questioning 
the unquestioned assumptions of the natural attitude, i.e. to see the enigmatic in the self-
explanatory. The question then becomes how this attitude can be taken up. Meditation, 
as well as phenomenology, is a method for opening the eye to a new possibility to see 
the world in its own way to appear to us. The first step should be the discovery of the 
wandering/disconnected mind:  
“Eventually, it begins to dawn on the meditators that there is an 
actual difference between being present and not being present. In daily 
life they also begin to have instants of waking up to the realization that 
they are not present and of flashing back for a moment to be present - 
not to the breath, in this case, but to whatever is going on. Thus the first 
great discovery of mindfulness meditation tends to be not some 
encompassing insight into the nature of mind but the piercing realization 
of just how disconnected humans normally are from their very 
experience (Varela, et al., 1991, p. 25).  
 
This is the proper meaning of the mindfulness meditation – and of 
phenomenology as well – that is to develop the awareness not only about the ordinary 
objects or the reality in general but also about one’s own mind, one’s own cognitive 
posture (Mortari, 2002; 2003). 
The life of the mind is a flowing life, it is a fresh, pure and clean water that 
flows underground: we do not hear it but we do feel it, we do not see it but we know it 
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is there. The interiority is not seen, it is experienced. And the awareness is nothing more 
than paying attention and giving voice to the life of the mind, avoiding the abstract 
attitude so common in our ordinary life. As Varela and colleagues remark (1991, pp. 25-
26):  
“From the point of view of mindfulness/awareness meditation, 
humans are not trapped forever in the abstract attitude. The dissociation 
of mind from body, of awareness from experience, is the result of habit, 
and these habits can be broken. As the meditator again and interrupts 
the flow of discursive thought and returns to be present with his breath 
or daily activity, there is a gradual taming of the mind’s restlessness. 
One begins to be able to see the restlessness as such and to become 
patient with it, rather than becoming automatically lost in it. Eventually 
meditators report periods of a more panoramic perspective. This is 
called awareness. 
 
Also Demetrio (2000, p. 112) says that “L’interiorità non è né contenuto, né 
contenitore: è atto mentale, è procedimento intenzionale che si interroga su questa sua 
presenza, che dismette, e definitivamente, ogni inseguimento della sua essenza”. 
Through meditation, expert meditators seem to reach a cognitive maturity, 
which reflects the ability to calm the mind, to live a state of rest and control on the flow 
of consciousness, whereas the beginning meditators are still prey of a random and 
chaotic flow of consciousness.  
The crucial point of this cognitive maturity seems to be the ability to keep the 
mind focused on its own movement within the ongoing experience, a sort of control of 
dynamic nature of the mind without reducing the dynamism but on the other hand,  
being aware of it and remaining to it in close contact with the reality of the experience 
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avoiding mental distractors. As Varela and colleagues suggest (Varela, et al., 1999, p. 
26), 
“As all these habits are cut through and one learns an attitude of 
letting go, the mind’s natural characteristic of knowing itself and 
reflecting its own experience can shine forth. This is the beginning of 
wisdom or maturity (prajña). It is important to realize that such maturity 
does not mean assuming the abstract attitude. As Buddhist teachers often 
point out, knowledge, in the sense of prajña, is not knowledge about 
anything. There is no abstract knower of an experience that is separate 
from the experience itself. Buddhist teachers often talk of becoming one 
with one’s experience”.  
 
 
 
4.2	  Qualitative	  method	  and	  the	  study	  of	  consciousness	  
The qualitative research on meditation is not well developed yet. Even the 
quantitative one, though it has reached more results so far, is in its inception for what 
concerns self perception in meditation. We definitely need to further explore this topic, 
especially its educational values and effect. Starting from the study I conducted, I want 
to stress the role and the importance of qualitative methods for investigating the first 
person perspective and phenomenal consciousness; I also want to remark on the 
importance of discussing further the role of qualitative methods for the cognitive 
sciences. 
There are three points that emerge from my study: 
a) FPP in meditation: as I said, there are no studies about the FPP in meditation 
designed as the one I conducted, with a special focus on the pristine experience. 
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This is something that needs to be further explored. However, we can say that 
experts meditators are privileged subjects to explore FPP since they are trained 
to deal with state of consciousness; on the other hand the comparison with 
beginners is definitely interesting because it allows us to see how meditation 
training changes the FPP. We also need to consider that the comparison between 
two different groups is not done very often in the qualitative research. That is 
why I consider this strategy quite innovative and interesting. 
b) FPP: descriptive data vs. reflective data.  As we saw the procedure to investigate 
and obtain descriptive data is more useful for studying the pristine experience 
and the embodied consciousness; the reflective data obtained through the 
interviews, on the contrary, are more useful for studying the meaning attribution 
and the sense making to lived experience. In education and especially in 
qualitative research literature the reflective data and the investigation about the 
self are much more common than the descriptive data. I think we need to open a 
debate about the descriptive data within qualitative research approach. 
c) Qualitative and quantitative research approaches. These two different 
approaches have always been in conflict since their inception. Recently some 
steps in the direction of a more respectful consideration and a closer 
collaboration are been made (Dawson, et al., 2006). There is also a new research 
approach called ‘mix-methods’, which takes advantage of both methodologies. 
In the case of my study I want to point out that a ‘bottom-up’ research lets 
categories that are not possible to see otherwise emerge. Speaking about 
meditation, we know that there are some questionnaires for analyzing  
awareness and these questionnaires have some subscales. The problem, from a 
qualitative point of view, is that the questionnaires require a pre-established 
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framework for the interpretation of the concept of awareness, or others, and that 
lets only the categories already provided within that framework emerge. The 
qualitative approach, instead, allows the subjects to create there own description 
and interpretation about every single phenomena and this can make some new or 
different categories emerge that are not present in the questionnaires. The best 
example for that is the one related to the ‘Embodied cognition’ and ‘Being in the 
space’ clusters we found in our data. If we consider one of the most used and 
well considered questionnaire, the 5 Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, we can 
see that it has 5 different subscales: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner 
experience. As you can see on five dimensions only one is dedicated to the 
bodily aspect of the awareness and, moreover, it has to do only with the action 
not with the bodily perception. With the qualitative data we found not only more 
and different categories but also more detailed ones, as you can see from the 
‘body scan’ and ‘body mereology’ categories. 
 
 Thus, the study of consciousness, that is the way in which the subject lives and 
interprets his own experience, is quite a ‘hot’ topic nowadays, even in cognitive science 
(Petitmengin, 2006; Petitmengin, et al. 2009; Overgaard, et al, 2008). But the 
experience is not fixed once forever; it changes through the new experience that a 
person acquires and, when it is possible, through the intentional and pedagogical 
description/interpretation of that experience (Depraz, et al. 2003; Mortari, 2003). We  
mustn't forget that qualitative methods are always transformative methods because 
while investigating the subjective experience the subject himself gains more awareness 
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about it. As for the educational value of the qualitative research on subjective 
experience , Varela and Shear (1999, p. 4) say that: 
“…experience, in human practices is the privileged entry point 
for change mediated by professional interventions of all kinds, such as 
education and learning, sports training, and psychotherapy. In all these 
domains there is abundant evidence not only that the realm of experience 
is essential for human activity and life involving the use of one’s own 
mind, but that the experiential domain can be explored, as we see in 
transformations mediated by specific practices and human interactions 
in prescribed settings (training course, sports coaching, 
psychotherapeutic sessions). Again, we need to put into question the 
assumption that the demarcation line between the strictly subpersonal 
and conscious are fixed and given once and forever. First-person 
methodologies include as a fundamental dimension the claim that this is 
a movable line, and much can be done with the intermediate zone. 
Exploring the pre-reflexive represents a rich and largely unexplored 
source of information and data with dramatic consequences.” 
 
Finally I want to remark that the method we used for this study has some 
particularities that make it original with respect to the standard qualitative methods, 
both phenomenological and of other traditions. Here I want to list some differences that 
require further investigations within the qualitative research approach: 
1) Comparison between groups; 
2) Standardized samples; 
3) Experimental/blocked design;  
4) Repeated experiences and repeated description of the experiences; 
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4.3	   Future	  perspectives	  
The various meditative practices available today are catching on in Western 
society with even greater force, mainly in informal contexts like extra-curricular and 
extra-corporate training (evening classes, retreats, associations and groups). It is 
important to note that an increasing number of schools, universities and companies are 
offering students and employees various kinds of meditation courses. The study of the 
educational value of courses offered to the public by the various agencies involved, 
formal and informal, appears to be of some interest from a pedagogical point of view. 
The study of training processes underlying meditation and mindfulness practice 
has become the subject of research only recently, not widely, and mainly in relation to 
children and adolescents. As I showed earlier, additional studies can be found in the 
anthropological and psychological sciences and neuroscience. From an educational 
point of view, however, the most important indications for further studies involve the 
necessity to investigate more the subjective pristine experience as I did in my study; 
then, further investigations about the self and meditation within the educational field are 
needed. Also the didactical structure of the meditation courses have to be more 
investigated, especially the design of meditation teaching methods and the evaluation of 
meditation courses – for all ages, included adults – that is their pedagogical fallout.  
The most obvious applications of meditation relate to the pedagogy of the body 
and to meditation instruction, particularly as it enjoys crescent popularity in the West. 
Such practices can be included in the general categories of ‘outdoor training’ and 
‘experiential learning’ which have come to play primary roles in the new landscape of 
education sciences. Some phenomenological research methods seem to be useful for the 
study of the ‘first person’ perspective and above all, of the changes in that perspective 
during and following important bodily experiences, such as those experienced in 
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meditation practice. All these methods, including the ‘Snapshot Method’ which I 
broached in this thesis, have rarely been implied in the realm of education, of 
consciousness or its transformative dimension. I believe it is time for a shift to the body 
dimension in phenomenological research as well as in the mixed field between 
education and cognitive sciences, especially with regards to experiential education and 
bodily experience in general, and meditation practices in particular. 
Some further studies are needed in the future, in particular: 
1) Replication of the same design to make a comparison for the validation of the 
study I conducted and have presented in this thesis; 
2) Comparison with a similar study to realize in Italy; 
3) More investigation about the bodily dimension of meditation through qualitative 
research methods, including the pristine subjective experience; 
4) A pedagogical investigation of the meditation schools, courses, and programs. 
More precisely the didactic and teaching practices and policies of meditation 
have to be the object of further studies. 
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Attachments	  	  
1. Open-ended questions. Semi-structured interview.  
 
 
- General experience description dimension: How would you describe the 
meditation experience you have been through in these weeks? Would you like to repeat 
it, change it or just never do it again? 
 
- General experience description dimension: What are the most important 
benefits or problems you have experienced during this experience? 
 
- Feeling/emotions dimension: What were the main feeling and/or emotions you 
had during the relaxation? 
 
- Distractors/attractors dimension: Did you have any problem to relax or to 
focus on your breathe? Did you experience any mental and/or physical obstacles in 
being relaxed and focused on your breathe? Did anything help you in being relaxed and 
focused on your breathe? Could you list and describe them? 
 
- Reflective and metacognitive dimension: How was describing the meditative 
experience?  Did you have any difficulty describing through words your inner 
experience? Do you think that reflecting about the experience changed the experience 
itself? Do you think that describing the meditative experience has been useful and 
helpful for you? In which way? 
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Bodily dimension: How would you describe the role of your body in this 
experience? Did you notice any change in your bodily perception during and after the 
relaxation experience (immediately after, few hours after, and now)?  
 
- General experience description dimension: Do you have any other comment 
you would like to say? 
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2. Instructions 
 
 
 
 
1. Meditation 
Please find a comfortable position, close your eyes, take a long and deep breath. Then 
relax your body, breathe slowly and naturally. Try to be focused on your breath. 
 
 
 
2. Short written self-report 
Please describe as closely as possible the experience you have been through just now as 
you lived it.  
 
The writing of the self-report should take less than 5 minutes. You can write it on the 
notebook or directly in electronic format and send it to the investigator by email 
(denis.francesconi@unitn.it).  
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ID#:________________________________                                    Date_________ 
                                              
5-FACTOR  Mindfulness Questionnaire 
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided.   
Write the number in the blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true 
for you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
never or very 
rarely true 
rarely 
true 
sometimes 
true 
often 
true 
very often or 
always true 
_____ 1.  When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving. 
_____ 2.  I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings. 
_____ 3.  I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. 
_____ 4.  I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them. 
_____ 5.  When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted. 
_____ 6.  When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body. 
_____ 7.  I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words. 
_____ 8.  I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or otherwise 
distracted. 
_____ 9.  I watch my feelings without getting lost in them. 
_____ 10. I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. 
_____ 11. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions. 
_____ 12. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking. 
_____ 13. I am easily distracted. 
_____ 14. I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way. 
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_____ 15. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face. 
PLEASE TURN OVER   ¸ 
1 2 3 4 5 
never or very 
rarely true 
rarely true  sometimes true 
  
often true very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 16. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things 
_____ 17. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad. 
_____ 18. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 
_____ 19. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the thought 
or image without getting taken over by it. 
_____ 20. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing. 
_____ 21. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting. 
_____ 22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because I can’t 
find the right words. 
_____ 23. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m doing. 
 _____24. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after. 
_____ 25. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 
_____ 26. I notice the smells and aromas of things. 
_____ 27. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words. 
_____ 28. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
_____ 29. When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them without 
reacting. 
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_____ 30. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them. 
PLEASE TURN OVER   
1 2 3 4 5 
never or very 
rarely true 
rarely true  sometimes true 
  
often true very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 31. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of 
light and shadow. 
_____ 32. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words. 
_____ 33. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go. 
_____ 34. I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing. 
_____ 35. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad, depending 
what the thought/image is about. 
_____ 36. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior. 
_____ 37. I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail. 
_____ 38. I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
_____ 39. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas. 
 
 
